MARCH
1955
50¢

THE ARMY
COMBAT FORCES
JOURNAL



The Army's Bell-developed XV-3 Convertiplane

Two Important articles on the Army's Future—

MAN: THE VITAL WEAPON. A statement by General Ridgway

TOMORROW'S BATTLEFIELD. An interview with General Gavin

GUARDING THE HOME FRONT
Col. William B. Bunker

THE BATTLE FOR PORK CHOP
Col. William R. Kintner

UNLOAD THE OLD BROMIDES

"The Military élite is probably the most competent corps of officials concerned with national policy in the American Government today"

DANIEL LERNER

AROUND much of the globe, military men now chart the course of human apprehension and aspiration. To perceive the new role of the military élites in our time, we must unload traditional stereotypes of "the military mind," along with other conceptual baggage carried along from a time when war-peace was a useful dichotomy. Today, the foreboding of atomic catastrophe weights all factors in the calculus of international politics; and this pervasive threat of violence—neither war nor peace—makes military thinking a major component of all political strategy. Their augmented impact on supreme decision relocates the soldiery in the social landscape.

The simple conventions of an isolate past—idealizing the Military Hero in wartime and thumping the Brass Hat in peacetime—become simple-minded under conditions of global leadership in hot-and-cold belligerence. They likely mislead us nowadays to deprecate the soldiery when they need civil support (*e.g.*, against an "economy" legislature) and to celebrate them when they might better be chastened (*e.g.*, for contriving spurious "war scares"). These soporific effects of old bromides can be avoided by recognizing that the military mind is now an indispensable engine of national action; and further, that the military élite is probably the most competent corps of officials concerned with national policy in the American Government today.

Among current military leaders, competence has been enhanced by *experience:* No other homogeneous group of Americans has had the sustained practice in shaping and administering national policy that has been shared by Marshall, Eisenhower, Bradley, Clay, Smith, Clark, Ridgway, Gruenther, Radford, etc. Younger members of the military corps are being prepared for future leadership by *training:* Any teacher examining the curriculum at West Point and the War Colleges will see here the *only* programs that coordinate all instruments of policy—military, economic, political, psychological—for training men to think naturally in terms of a global arena of national action. Our diplomats receive no such discipline. Nor do our legislators and bureaucrats. Our traditional faith in civilian supremacy is already compromised in fact, however devoutly the rituals may be cherished, by the sheer superiority of the military corps *qua* corps.

The rise of the military élites to their present eminence is illuminated by the histories and memoirs of World War II, and particularly by the Army's official subseries, *The War Department*. The entire series, while sponsored by the Office of Military History, is produced under an Advisory Committee comprising our top civilian historians, and the individual volumes are written by other civilians of professional standing. This relationship illustrates one of the ways whereby the military élite has established its predominance in the domain of current research. Superior information is a potent instrument of military influence and, wedded to the product of its own intelligence services and its contract research agencies (ORO, HumRRO, HRRI, RAND, etc.), this method of "internalizing" civilian skills has its value. It puts these skills to use, by and large, on problems selected by the military in perspectives defined by the military. As General Orlando Ward, [former] Chief of Military History, says in a foreword: "The viewpoint is from within. . . ."

THE issues of *Wehrpolitik* are still with us, indeed are likely to continue as the shaping influence on our future history. Among these issues are the place of military thinking in our national policy and of military men in our social structure. It is in the cards that our military élite must play an augmented role in national leadership. Hence it is well that the soldiers have taken their responsibilities seriously and are, by training and by organizational technique, developing a corps of competent participants in the shaping of supreme policy. It is less cheerful that our political spokesmen and particularly our elected legislators show, by contrast, an abysmal ineptitude on issues of *Wehrpolitik*, and that our civilian public exhibits an abysmal disinterest.

There is great need for spreading enlightenment on the political meaning of military strategy today, for in a global arena all strategy is geopolitical. This means that military decisions, unless shaped by clear political goals, will cumulatively determine the boundaries within which our political choices must be contained. Where military prescriptions for national security and political requirements for global leadership have not precisely coincided, the political spokesmen and their constituencies have usually presented the weaker case (if any). Since there is no reason to assume higher IQs among soldiers, we attribute their superiority to superior organization and information. This shows itself in little things like attention to historical detail. It is certain, for example, that large numbers of military men will study carefully the [official histories]. I wonder how many civilians will look at them.

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COMMAND PERFORMANCE

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
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OFFSHORE AIRBUS—Going to and from work in Sikorsky helicopters is now routine for crews drilling oil wells offshore. In the Gulf of Mexico, helicopters have made as many as 2000 scheduled flights a month for one company alone. They have introduced new operating methods offshore. Here, an S-55 nears a tender's landing platform.


AROUND THE WORLD WITH SIKORSKY HELICOPTERS



NEWFOUNDLAND PATROL—This commercial Sikorsky S-55 now regularly polices Newfoundland's extensive coastal waters, on duty with the Fisheries Department of Canada. Speed, versatility and rugged stamina of the big Sikorsky make it an ideal vehicle, especially for work in remote areas where surface travel is difficult.



NORTH SEA RESCUE—In mid-January, 16 crewmen from a Norwegian freighter, grounded on the coast of Holland, were rescued by the Royal Dutch Navy helicopter shown above with one of the rescued men. The big Sikorsky, an S-55 Navy version from a Dutch aircraft carrier, made five quick flights to carry the men to the beach.



TREE-TOP MINING PROSPECTOR—Modern electronics and Sikorsky's S-55 commercial helicopter are combined in a new aerial prospecting technique developed by Aero Service Corporation, Philadelphia. Data on underground mineral-bearing formations are disclosed by magnetometer, flown over an area at tree-top height. Such geophysical surveys are far faster, reveal more and cost less than slow ground studies.

HELICOPTER HISTORY:



America's first world helicopter record—set by Sikorsky's VS-300

MAY 6, 1941—Flying his historic VS-300, Igor Sikorsky, nearly 14 years ago, remained in the air for 1 hour 32 minutes 26 seconds, to bring America her first world helicopter record.

The VS-300 was first of the many Sikorsky achievements in advancing helicopter design, development and production.

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
"The Association of the U. S. Army shall be an organization wherein all who are in accord with its objectives may join in the exchange of ideas and information on military matters, and in fostering, supporting, and advocating the legitimate and proper role of the Army of the United States and of all its elements, branches, and components in providing for and assuring the Nation's military security."

ASSOCIATION'S JOURNAL

WE should start off with a rousing "Get Out the Vote" slogan in order to call your attention to the Association's ballot and report of its nominating committee on pages 62 and 63. This is the first time since the beginning of the Korean war that our members have had a chance to vote for the Association's officers and for members of the Executive Council and it is the hope of every member of the Council that a large and representative vote be cast. Full details as to eligibility will be found in the report of the nominating committee. The Committee felt that because this was the first referendum of the membership it would be wise to quote in full the by-laws pertaining to voting requirements. If you are one of those persons who absolutely refuse to mar your copy of the JOURNAL by tearing out a page, drop us a line and we will be glad to send you a copy of the ballot. If your time is limited you can make your own ballot; it's perfectly OK. If you are in the Washington area between now and the 20 April deadline and want to cast your ballot in person, a supply of ballots will be available in the Association's offices. Office hours: 8:30 to 5, Monday through Friday.

THE PUBLISHER.

Official Association Seal



The Executive Council of the Association of the U.S. Army examined the entries in the Association's seal contest at its January meeting and accepted the winning entry by Major William M. Chapman (as announced in our January issue) after suggesting the substitution of the eternal flame for the initials of the Association on the shield. Major Chapman accepted the modification and executed the new design which is shown here. The seal is now the official emblem of the Association of the U.S. Army. Its principal use will be as a medal presented to leading ROTC graduates.

THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL

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The ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL is a professional military magazine devoted to the dissemination of information and ideas relating to the military art and science representing the interests of the entire Army.

The ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL strives to—

Advance man's knowledge of warfare in the fields of strategy, tactics, logistics, operations, administration, weapons and weapons systems.

Advance man's knowledge and understanding of the soldier as an individual, as a member of a trained unit, and as a member of the whole Army; emphasizing leadership, esprit, loyalty, and a high sense of duty.

Disseminate knowledge of military history, especially articles that have application to current problems or foster tradition and create esprit.

Explain the important and vital role of the United States Army in the Nation's defense and show that the Army is alert to the challenges of new weapons, machines, and methods.

Advance the status of the soldier's profession.

(Adopted by the Executive Council of the Association of the U. S. Army, 21 June 1954)

THE COVER

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THE MONTH'S MAIL

A Medal for Colonel Hall

● I have never written before to the editor; but I must tell you how much I enjoyed "A Medal for Horatius." I think Colonel Hall has done one of the really delightful pieces of this or any other year.

Being something of a practitioner in the field of humorous fiction (I can't quite believe Colonel Hall went to the records for this one), as well as having had some four years of experience with military matters a few years ago, I feel I am a fair judge of someone who has that genuine light touch. It is not often that irony is combined so satisfactorily with gayety. As a faithful and appreciative reader of your magazine, I want to recommend that you persuade Colonel Hall to keep seeing the situation, not as a whole, but in its crazier components.

LT. COL. ROBERT CARSON
1030 Stone Canyon Road
Los Angeles 24, Calif.

The Bigger Journal

The Editors have received a number of letters commenting on the merger of the Antiaircraft Journal. Extracts from some of them appear here.

. . . It should, indeed, provide a fine professional publication which cannot help but be of great value to all members of the Army.

J. LAWTON COLLINS
Gen., U. S. Army
Special Representative of
the United States in Vietnam

. . . This merger is a major accomplishment and one which will be beneficial to the Army.

The members of the Far East Command extend best wishes to the newly expanded Association.

J. E. HULL
Gen., U. S. Army
Hq. Far East Command
APO 500, San Francisco, Calif.

. . . The efforts of the Association of the United States Army to create an Army-wide association and to provide an interesting, valuable publication are noteworthy. That these efforts have been so successful is a tribute to you and the staff of the Association. . .

I heartily indorse the goals of the Association and wish you continued success in your efforts.

H. I. HODES
Lt. Gen., U. S. Army
Hq. VII Corps
APO 107

. . . I was very pleased to learn that the U. S. Antiaircraft Association and its Journal will merge with our Association and JOURNAL. . .

I am an avid reader of the JOURNAL, which I think is very fine. . .

A. C. MCAULIFFE
Lt. Gen., U. S. Army
Hq. Seventh Army
APO 46, New York, N. Y.

. . . I believe that this combined effort will serve to motivate professional soldiers toward a common goal of purpose and fellowship. . .

F. L. PARKS
Lt. Gen., U. S. Army
Hq. Second Army
Fort George G. Meade, Md.

. . . Without doubt the merger will prove beneficial to the members of both associations. I am also confident that the important status of the ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL as a professional military journal will be even further enhanced. . .

W. G. WYMAN
Lt. Gen., U. S. Army
Hq. Sixth Army
Presidio of San Francisco, Calif.

. . . The consolidation of these associations and publications will result in an increase in effectiveness and interest, and will add materially to the benefits derived by your membership and readers.

You may be assured of my continuing support of the Association and of the JOURNAL.

A. R. BOLLING
Lt. Gen., U. S. Army
Hq. Third Army
Fort McPherson, Ga.

● "A Medal for Horatius" in the January JOURNAL is one of the best of its kind I have read since the old *Infantry Journal* published "GI Description of a Shoelace."

My copy of the shoelace story vanished long before the war was over, to my regret ever since. Is it possible to obtain a copy in these days?

CAPT. ROBERT H. JOHNSON
1400 Central Tower
San Francisco 3, Calif.

"GI Description of a Shoelace" appeared in the February 1944 issue of the INFANTRY JOURNAL. *That issue has long been a collectors' item.*

● Every reader should be grateful for Colonel Hall's brilliant article on the sad fate of Captain Horatius and his disappearing medal. In the twenty-one hundred years which have elapsed since his misadventure there have of course been giant strides in expediting military procedures. The scope of this achievement may perhaps be illustrated by the following episode.


On 20 June 1916 a National Guard battery was called into federal service. Within a week thereafter it entrained for the Mexican border. Its members represented the lower-income brackets, if any!

As every soldier knows, payrolls must cover full months, so the first possible one was that of 1 August. From that day on 136 men listened with breathless eagerness for pay call. Silence prevailed. Soon the payroll was returned with the indorsement: "Returned because put together by detachable clips instead of by red tape as required by Regulation ABC. Consolidate with 1 September payroll."

One hundred and thirty-six men lived in poverty for another thirty-one days and excitement was intense when it was known that the 1 September payroll—consolidated with infinite pains—was on its way. Again silence. Again back came the payroll. This time the indorsement said: "Returned because put together by red tape instead of by detachable clips as required by Regulation XYZ."

Even though the battery was then on the Rio Grande, the ensuing howl of rage could have been heard both in Mexico City and Washington. Even the colonel of the regiment heard it and took action. Finally, toward the end of September, three months after the battery had entered service, the men were paid.

DOUBLE BARRELLED!



Deadly efficient are these two defenders of Democracy . . . and the USAF is ready to "let go" with both barrels should the need arise. ➤➤➤ *One of these twins, the* ***F84F THUNDERSTREAK,*** *is now in active service and able on instant notice to deliver its nuclear wallop in retaliation.* ➤➤➤ *Its photo-reconnaissance counterpart, the* ***RF-84F THUNDERFLASH,*** *has power and speed to locate the target, identify it in detail by use of the latest aerial photographic equipment . . . and if necessary, fight its way home guarding the secrets it has uncovered.*



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Let no one maintain that this account is exaggerated. It is scientifically accurate, as I know all too well. I was the battery clerk! Please sign me . . . .

PANCHO VILLA

Boston, Mass.

Monty's Assessment

● In attempting to assess the nature of future warfare, the condensed version of the talk by Field Marshal Montgomery [January] has been read with a great deal of interest. In particular, I was quite anxious to obtain his evaluation of the now classic problem: Will, or will not, nuclear weapons be used in the future, if war should occur?

However, there appears to be within the article a position that essentially is untenable, and I should appreciate receiving your view as to whether or not I have distorted his meaning by wrenching portions of the talk out of context or whether the implications appear also to you to be present.

The following quotations are pertinent:

". . . It will become increasingly clear that a *hot* [my italics] war will be mutual suicide for the contestants."

"I want to make it absolutely clear that we at SHAPE are basing all our operational planning on using atomic and thermonuclear weapons in our defense. With us it is no longer: 'They may possibly be used.' It is very definitely: 'They will be used if we are attacked.'"

"The reason for this action is that we cannot match the strength that could be brought against us unless we use nuclear weapons, and our political chiefs have never shown any great enthusiasm in giving us the numbers to be able to do without using such weapons."

The above set of quotations appears to say that a hot war in which atomic and thermonuclear weapons are used will be *"mutual suicide."* (My italics.) The Field Marshal then goes on to indicate that SHAPE cannot "win" a war without the use of atomic and thermonuclear weapons and is planning to use them. This would appear to be a declaration on his part to the effect that mutual suicide is the only possible result of a future hot war. In the normal meaning of the words, mutual suicide would simply mean that Western civilization, to include both the American and Russian portions thereof, would disappear from the earth.

As you may readily see, such an outcome would call for planning on a way to fight a war in which a decision could be reached without incurring "mutual suicide."

As indicated above, I should appreciate learning the extent to which you believe that the above interpretation is a serious distortion of the intent of the Field Marshal's remarks.

COL. H. F. SYKES, JR.

CO, ERDL
Fort Belvoir, Va.

Colonel Sykes has indeed spotted an inconsistency in Viscount Montgomery's assessment of future war, although it is only fair to add that Monty seems to believe that the "mutual suicide" of a thermonuclear war will come about only by the miscalculation of one side or the other. Our own belief is that great soldiers have as much right as great statesmen to be inconsistent, and so we would fault the Field Marshal less on that account than we would on the basis of his new-found belief in the dominance of air power. Indeed, his own expressed estimate that a future global war will have three phases of which only the first phase will be fought predominantly by air fleets while the second phase will be primarily the battle of the ground armies, and the third will be the "bargaining phase," does not suggest that air power will dominate. If it were, the second phase would hardly be necessary. As a matter of fact, Monty's three phases look strangely like the several phases of World War II—in both Europe and the Pacific.

"Faithful to Our Trust"

● Thank God for people like the author of "Faithful to Our Trust"! I hope he will let me pour him a drink sometime in a room of mine. . .

This article is so germane to the entire problem facing the United States that the author ought to be a party to our Council of State. So many of us who are trying to be soldiers know what he is talking about.

THE JOURNAL is doing a courageous thing when it prints ideas that bear on the integrity of the Army, for the character of a nation is pretty well reflected not so much by the *auxiliary* arms, like the naval and air forces, as by the worth of its land forces.

LT. COL. DONOVAN YEUELL, JR.

Arlington, Va.

Artillery Integration

● Your articles on the integration of field and antiaircraft artillery have certainly provoked a great deal of discussion among the students in the Artillery Officers' Advanced Course here. "Integration" is by far the most popular break-time bull session topic.

CAPT. JOSIAH A. WALLACE, JR.

AA&GM School
Fort Bliss, Tex.

● In Iowa, we hear a lot about hybrids—hybrid corn, that is. The experts work continually to evolve new varieties, of which the successful ones are retained and the others discarded.

One military hybrid which should be discarded as unsuccessful is the merger of the field and antiaircraft artillery branches so skillfully pinpointed by Colonel Hallock in "It Seemed Like a Good Idea" [November issue.]

Experience in Korea amply demonstrated the fallacy of the merger in practice. I remember the succession of willing but bewildered AAA majors and captains who came into our headquarters under the nondiscriminating "Arty" label which seeks to be all things to all artillerymen. There are just so many S1 and S4 jobs.

Now, if anyone presented me with a battery of 90mm guns and directed me to fire a trial-shot problem, I should call for the executive. If he, like me, happened to be an FA peg in an AAA hole, we would be off to a rough start. Conversely, I have seen the look of utter disbelief upon AAA faces when in first contemplation of the aiming circle in its functional relationship to the orienting line, panoramic telescope, and 105mm howitzer.

Actually, the chances of these situations occurring are thinning out, as COs and personnel officers at the working level seek to solve the problem in their own way. Now we often see orders concerning "Captain John R. Jones, Arty (FA)." So we have evolved from two branch letters to six letters and a brace of parentheses. This is progress?

Let's be honest and reconstitute two legal branches in law as well as in fact: the FA and the AAA.

AAA should retain its secondary role as reinforcing FA, but its main job is antiaircraft fire. FA is far closer to infantry and armor in practice than it is to AAA.

MAJOR WILLIAM W. COVER

Iowa State College
Ames, Ia.

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• With reference to General Parker's article, "It will Take a Whole New Generation" [January], I would like to be the first enrolled in the new generation. Since the beginning of cross-assignment for artillerymen, I have commanded batteries and worked on staffs of both field and antiaircraft battalions, and I am confident that my efficiency has not been affected. After the experience I have had in the past four years, I am confident that I can perform any command or regular staff job in either type of artillery, from the 280mm and missile group to the 105mm and caliber .50 group. I base this on the fact that I have accepted the decision of my superiors and feel that anyone willing to broaden his knowledge has a wonderful opportunity in the Artillery branch of today.

CAPT. SAM B. CARR, JR.
Btry D, 518th AAA Bn
Camp Hanford, Wash.

December Issue

• Congratulations on your December issue! It is an issue that is very helpful to a unit commander.

No one can deny that Sergeant Clifford's article, "How to be a Noncom," was thought out and to the point. It was so timely that I am using it as a complete reference for my next noncom class.

Colonel Miles certainly pointed up my weak spots with "Let's Put Sense in CBR Training." Here is a wealth of information that can better prepare my unit for any CBR emergency.

"Night Ambush Patrol" by Colonel Juskalian is a combat lesson proven by combat experience. Yes, we artillerymen may some day have to provide ambush patrols. I am sure the Y formation will help mine succeed.

All in all, I am happy to give a vote of thanks for your December issue. I hope that more of this caliber are forthcoming.

CAPT. JAMES I. MILLER
265th FA Bn
APO 34, NYC

Mental Mobility

• In his address to the National Guard Association ["An Army on its Toes," December 1954], General Ridgway discussed the necessity for mobility to give the Army the effective strength it will need in future wars. I was impressed with his statement that "Above all, *mental* mobility will be a prerequisite for successful military operations. Static thinking . . . cannot be tolerated."

The present concept of strategic operations—the employment of "elite," hard-hitting forces, with mobility to increase their striking power—brings about the need for greater centralization of control and rapidity of communications than ever before. Will it actually be possible for our forces to be controlled either in peripheral actions or in an all-out war?

I do not feel that the ability to control communications has kept pace with our strategic or tactical mobility. This is not because of a lack of scientific advances or technological proficiency. It is rather because of this lack of "mental mobility." We seem to have confined our thinking to the weapon and the vehicle and given too little thought to the problem of controlling our power.

Under our present organization we have so complicated the process of making a decision, translating that decision into an order, and then delivering it, that the advances which have been made in the communications field over the past twenty years are negated.

The problems of staffing papers are too well known to need description here. Basic to the solution of this problem, though, is the other subject about which so much has been said in THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL over the past few years—the lack of trust which is so prevalent in our Officer Corps today. There is so much fear of censure in the Officer Corps that it is like looking for a needle in a haystack to find an officer in the Pentagon who will give a straightforward yes or no answer. And if the question is about an overseas theatre, it is just added to the load on our extended communications lines. . . .

Another reason for lost time in our communications . . . is an exaggerated concern for form, processing, duplicating, recording, etc. Fear or lack of trust requires not only that we make seven copies but that they be of proper size and color with "t"s crossed and "i"s dotted or the information will be delayed for correction.

A little "mental mobility" could well be applied to the problem of arriving at atomic-age decisions and translating those decisions into timely action on the other side of the world.

COL. DAVID P. GIBBS
Hq. FECOM
APO 500

Noncoms at Fort Campbell

• SFC Walter Johnson in the December JOURNAL has some well-taken points, and he will probably be glad to know that many other persons are thinking along the same lines. Next to the establishment of the Air Force Academy and a Medical Officers' Academy, the establishment of an NCO Academy is one of the most important schools the combat forces can sponsor.

His second point, of establishing a system of selection of NCOs, is currently in operation in the 11th Airborne Division. Prior to being promoted to NCO rank, a man must be a parachutist, a qualified jumpmaster, a graduate of the Division's NCO academy, an expert in his basic weapon, and be able to fire all T/O&E weapons of his unit. He must be able to operate all vehicles up to and including the 2-½-ton truck, be proficient in the 25-mile road march and the paratroopers' quick march (five miles in one hour with full equipment), be able to swim a hundred yards in full equipment, and attain a certain educational level up to one year of college for master sergeants. This is a long way from the finished product, but no one, so far, has offered to improve it.

The third point—rotation at battalion level—was put into effect in some divisions in Korea. Of course, the replacement stream was still operating full blast, but battalions were rotated in and out of the line intact. Perhaps the current GYROSCOPE plan will be the answer to this point. It is interesting to note that rotation by unit was recommended in 1947.

As far as making the draft for three years is concerned, it is believed that if the recommendations of the Kean Board of 1947 were followed, there would be no need for the draft.

The fifth point—the return of the old first sergeant—is currently in operation here. We have no such animal as the "field first sergeant" since the first sergeant has resumed those duties along with a few others he used to have. The old first sergeant cannot be requisitioned—he must be developed with the help of the NCOs, and we are doing it. The first sergeant should receive more pay than any other enlisted man in the company and should rank them all for assignment to quarters, for promotion, and in responsibilities and privileges. Furthermore, the sergeant major should be the highest-paid man in the regiment, and then first sergeants would buck for the job instead of dodging it.

The issue of dress blues would not necessarily help the situation since the man makes the uniform instead of the uniform making the man.

The seventh point—demand highest standards of leadership—could be fostered if NCOs committing delinquencies such as speeding, drunken driving, and making false official statements, were punished on the same basis as officers.

Sergeant Johnson's eighth point—return to spit and polish—is practiced in the 11th Airborne Division. We have formal guard mounts, Sunday retreat parades, payday muster and review with full field inspection, and the old Saturday morning inspections. In addition, the sergeant major holds First Sergeants' Call and the division sergeant major holds Sergeant Majors' Call. While it is not recognized by the T/O&E, it is a fact here that the sergeant major is the senior man in the unit and he carries the national colors at parades and reviews. We have restored the NCO advisory council to advise the commanding officer and the commanding general.

The use of NCOs as jumpmasters is stressed and even the junior NCOs are required to be qualified and to be able to jumpmaster a ship. In the mess, the corporals are used as table commandants while the other NCOs are served family style at their own tables with waiter service. All NCOs and their wives are received by the commanding general upon their arrival and are greeted and the facilities of the post explained to them.

M/SGT. RICHARD G. COOPER
Co. F, 188th AIR
Fort Campbell, Ky.

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THE MONTH'S AUTHORS

"IF you strike a prince you must kill him," wrote Machiavelli more than four hundred years ago. The cruel wisdom of these words has a harsh insistence today. The leaders of the Soviet Union know that if they strike at us with thermonuclear weapons they must be able to destroy us totally, or the consequences for Russia will be dire indeed. But if they know that we can parry the blow the Muscovite Machiavellians may well decide that discretion is the better part of valor.

We must have a shield as well as a sword, and it is with this shield that *Col. William B. Bunker's* article "Another Job for the Army: Guarding the Home Front" (page 32), is concerned. Colonel Bunker believes that Army ground forces in a civil defense role will be a major part of the shield.

If bombs fall, national survival will depend on supply, communications, and transport. Colonel Bunker, best known as one of the top helicopter men in the Army, has had a varied experience in logistics. During World War II he was Deputy to the Assistant Chief of Transportation, and in 1945 he became Transportation Officer of the Seventh Army. Three years later he was placed in charge of terminal operations in the Berlin Airlift. He is now Commandant of the Transportation School, Fort Eustis, Va.

Mr. Theodore White (page 20) would rank high in any list of contemporary journalists. He spent most of the Second World War in the Far East for *Time*. His free-lance beat for the past several years has been Europe but he is now back home "covering" the United States for *The Reporter* and other magazines. He was the editor of the papers of the late General Joseph W. Stilwell and the author of *Fire in the Ashes*, a report on the slow recovery of postwar Europe.

Colonel Waldon C. Winston (page 24) is presently on duty with the Troop Training Unit at the U. S. Naval Amphibious Base, San Diego, Calif.

Lieutenant Colonel Bidwell Moore, Artillery (page 26), is assigned to the Department of Combined Arms, The Artillery School, Fort Sill, Okla.

Colonel Ralph E. Pearson, Military Police Corps (page 28), came into the Regular Army through the Army Reserve in 1947.

Major Melvin Garten, Infantry (page 30), recently left Fort Bragg, N. C., for duty at The Infantry School.

Colonel William R. Kintner, Infantry (page 40), a frequent contributor to the JOURNAL, is assigned to the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Major Frank J. Jansen, Artillery (page 49) is with the Department of Observation, The Artillery School, Fort Sill.

Four of this month's cerebrators (pages 46-48), present new approaches to the ever-present problem of maintaining high morale, while two deal with techniques and equipment that may well be used in a future conflict. *Major John E. Murray*, Transportation Corps, is a special assistant to the Chief of Transportation. *Captain William E. McKenzie*, Infantry, is on duty at the USAREUR Press Center. *Colonel T. N. Dupuy*, Artillery, is a member of the Department of Military Science and Tactics at Harvard University. *Captain John R. Byers*, Armor, is presently assigned to the 3d Cavalry Regiment, Fort Meade, Md. *Lieutenant Colonel John C. Fralish*, Artillery, is attending the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.



COLONEL WILLIAM B. BUNKER

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
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FRONT AND CENTER

THE long-expected redesignation of Office, Chief of Army Field Forces, to Headquarters, Continental Army Command, took place almost simultaneously with the announcement by General John E. Dahlquist of the formation of staff sections for armor, artillery, and infantry. These sections, headed by Maj. Gen. Leander L. Doan (armor), Maj. Gen. Armistead D. Mead (infantry), and Maj. Gen. William E. Waters (artillery), have taken over some of the training functions of the G3 section and replaced the Combat Arms Advisory Board. The sections will be responsible for determining the state of training of individuals and units, developing doctrine, tactics, technique and organization, and establishing requirements for improved weapons and equipment. This reorganization will give the three principal combat arms a stronger representation at a headquarters that has increased scope and growing importance in training the Army and in directing the activities of the six continental armies. It also tidies up the staff of CONARC by reducing the responsibilities and activities of the G3 section which, as General Dahlquist has noted, had necessarily grown too large for full efficiency.

* * *

Nike missiles have been fired recently near Fort Churchill, Manitoba, in a Canadian-American test known as Operation JETFROST. *The purpose of the tests is to determine the effects of extreme low temperatures on the Nike. The Canadian troops participating included sixty soldiers who received training in operating the Nike at Fort Bliss last year. Any publishable results of the test will be released by Canadian Army headquarters at Ottawa. Last winter the U.S. Army's 280mm atomic cannon was tested at Fort Churchill.*

* * *

A battalion of 280mm atomic cannons is completing training at Fort Sill and will soon be sent to Europe to join the five battalions already with Seventh Army. NATO forces have been strengthened also by the recent arrival in Europe of an Army guided missile battalion. General A. C. McAuliffe, new commander of USAREUR, has also requested additional armored personnel carriers.

* * *

The long-discussed plan to separate noncoms from specialists will finally go into effect 1 July 1955. Specialists in the top four enlisted grades will receive new insignia before that date. New enlisted personnel records (Forms 20 and 24) will be adopted. New tables of organization will begin to be distributed to field commands this month and all units should have them by 1 June.

* * *

The root of the reserve problem is that only four out of every 100 draftees become active reservists when their two years of active service are over. At present there is no way to enforce the law, which requires them to attend drills for six additional years. One of the early proposals was to give an "other than honorable" discharge to men who do not fulfill their reserve obligation. When the new reserve bill was sent to Capitol Hill this requirement had been struck out. It is clear that, however the reserves may be reshuffled, they will only be a paper force so long as the draft law lacks reserve "teeth." Meanwhile, a four-year extension of the draft is moving along and probably will become law.

* * *

Manpower shortages and the need for more streamlined military units in the face of a possible atomic war are bringing about far-reaching changes in the armies of our allies as well as our own. The French have announced plans to organize "pocket" infantry divisions this year. These modernized units, say the French, will be equipped with a radar-controlled antitank rocket that an infantryman can control from his dugout. Details of the weapon are still secret.

The names of 862 Army officers selected to attend 1955-56 courses at service schools are listed in Circular No. 621-5, 28 January 1955. Here is a breakdown of the numbers assigned to each school from the arms and services;

Infantry: NWC 15; ICAF 3; AWC 62; Air WC 3; Naval WC (2d year course) 2; AFSC 20; CGSC 171; Naval WC (1st year course) 1; Naval WC (C&S course) 2. Total: 279.

Artillery: NWC 10; ICAF 2; AWC 45; Air WC 3; Naval WC (2d year course) 1; AFSC 14; CGSC 128; Naval WC (2d year course) 1; Naval WC (C&S course) 1. Total: 205.

Armor: NWC 4: ICAF 1; AWC 16; Air WC 1; Naval WC (2d year course) 1; AFSC 5; CGSC 43; Naval WC (1st year course) 1. Total: 72.

Corps of Engineers: NWC 2; ICAF 7; AWC 14; Air WC 1; AFSC 5; CGSC 46; Naval WC (C&S course) 1. Total: 76.

Signal Corps: NWC 1; ICAF 5; AWC 8; Naval WC (2d year course) 1; AFSC 3; CGSC 27. Total: 45.

Chemical Corps: NWC 1; ICAF 1; AWC 2; AFSC 1; CGSC 5; Naval WC (C&S course) 1. Total: 11.

Ordnance Corps: ICAF 6; AWC 7; Air WC 1; AFSC 3; CGSC 21; Naval WC (C&S course) 1. Total: 39.

Quartermaster Corps: NWC 1; ICAF 5; AWC 8; Naval WC (2d year course) 1; AFSC 3; CGSC 21. Total: 39.

Transportation Corps: ICAF 6; AWC 7; Air WC 1; AFSC 3; CGSC 21; Naval WC (1st year course) 1. Total: 39.

Army Medical Services: ICAF 2; AWC 4; AFSC 2; CGSC 9. Total: 17.

Adjutant General's Corps: ICAF 1; AWC 2; AFSC 1; CGSC 6. Total: 10.

Chaplain Corps: AWC 1; CGSC 2. Total: 3.

Finance Corps: AWC 2; AFSC 1; CGSC 5. Total: 8.

Judge Advocate General's Corps: AWC 2; AFSC 1; CGSC 4. Total: 7.

Military Police Corps: ICAF 1; AWC 2; AFSC 1; CGSC 8. Total: 12.

Editorial

What Ike Said

AT his first press conference following General Ridgway's statement that he believed the proposed reduction in strength of the Army would "jeopardize the security of the country to a degree," President Eisenhower firmly asserted that the decision had been his, that it "was not reached lightly," and that it was correct. The President said that he had come to the decision after long study and "in consultation with every single individual in this Government that I know of that bears any responsibility whatsoever about it." He had conferred with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and he knew "exactly who [among them] agrees with me and who doesn't."

It was reassuring to have the President affirm that the decision had been his alone. There had been much speculation in Washington as to the kind of advice the President was finding most persuasive. This however shed little light on the President's own reasoning and guiding purposes. It would seem more helpful to seek to trace the trend of the President's thinking through his public statements.

THIS process would seem to be rewarding in view of a thesis recently advanced by a highly respected Washington newspaperman, Mr. Joseph C. Harsch of *The Christian Science Monitor*. Mr. Harsch, seeking to determine why the President had failed to "logically explain . . . the Army Budget," came to the conclusion that the failure was "an implicit disclosure of first importance." Mr. Harsch suggests that the pulling and hauling between fiscal experts who argued that the nation could not afford to maintain both conventional and atomic warfare forces and military advisors who were moving towards a "point of no return in the use of atomic weapons" had involved the President in an "agonizing reappraisal far more agonizing than any Mr. Dulles ever had to endure over France."

A good place to begin such a review is with the President's 1954 State of the Union message. This heralded the New Look defense budget by noting that it was "based on a new military program [that] will make and keep America stronger in an age of peril." The President said the Administration was "taking into full account our great and growing number of nuclear weapons and the most effective means of using them against an aggressor if they are needed to preserve our freedom."

THIS phrase is reminiscent of Mr. Dulles's "massive retaliation" theme. But three months later (5 April 1954) the President said that the hydrogen bomb "was not going to be used by our initiative." And six months after that he revealed that the possible terrible effects of such weapons were weighing on his mind. War today, he observed on 20 October 1954, "does not present the possibility of victory or defeat. War would present to us only the alternatives in degrees of destruction."

He returned to the theme again in his most recent State of the Union message, on 6 January 1955:

"To protect our nations and our peoples from the catastrophe of a nuclear holocaust, free nations must maintain countervailing military power to persuade the Communists of the futility of seeking to advance their ends through aggression. If Communist rulers understand that America's response to aggression will be swift and decisive . . . they will be powerfully deterred from launching a military venture engulfing their own peoples and many others in disaster. Now this, of course, is a form of world stalemate. . . ."

While the President did not specifically state that our "countervailing military power" is our stock of nuclear bombs and long-range bombers, it appears that he was referring to them. Nor did he say that such response would come only if the aggression was by nuclear weapons. These points seem worth emphasizing if, as seems evident, the

Communists are less than wholly deterred from peripheral adventures by the threat of nuclear annihilation. The threat may have restrained the armies of the Soviet Union from marching across Europe in the early postwar years (although war fatigue and the successes Russia was having with propaganda and subversion in those days may have been just as influential), but Korea and Indochina and now Formosa are evidence that their Asiatic partners have been deterred (if at all) by their own military weaknesses rather than by the threat of massive retaliation.

THE theory that a choice had to be made between atomic weapons and conventional weapons—that we can't have both—is highly debatable. Also debatable is the "point of no return" thesis—the argument that the New Look defense program was committing us to exclusive reliance on atomic armament.

Brigadier General Thomas R. Phillips, retired, the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* analyst, has discussed the "point of no return" thesis more clearly than any other writer. "Once the Army, Navy and Air Force have become atomic armies, navies and air forces, once they have discarded the weak and outmoded conventional weapons, the time when a decision can be made not to use atomic weapons in war is past," General Phillips wrote in an article appearing in his paper on New Year's Day.

The President may have had the "point of no return" thesis in mind in his most recent State of the Union message when he said: ". . . we must stay alert to the fact that undue reliance on one weapon or preparation for only one kind of warfare simply invites an enemy to resort to another. We must, therefore, keep in our Armed Forces balance and flexibility adequate to our needs."

If this statement seems to reject the idea of depending solely on nuclear weapons, the paragraph that followed it expressed the idea that we may indeed be going in that direction: "To keep our Armed Forces abreast of the advances of science, our military planning must be flexible enough to utilize the new weapons and techniques which flow ever more speedily from our research and development programs. The forthcoming military budget therefore emphasizes modern airpower in the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps and increases the emphasis on new weapons, especially those of rapid and destructive striking power."

The omission of the Army as one of the services which are to "emphasize" modern airpower is disappointing. So too is the one sentence alluding specifically to the Army: "It [the Administration's military program] seeks continuous modernization of our Army."

There is no expansion on this. No suggestion of the kind or degree or speed of modernization. Should we not inquire whether there is not some danger that the "balance and flexibility adequate to our needs" may suffer if the Army is to be deemphasized?

COMING back to our original purpose of seeking to find the key to the President's purpose through his public statements, we may find it profitable to continue to examine some of his foreign policy statements.

While the President's course is not on a peace-at-any-price bearing (he once said that he would order an immediate attack against any nation launching an attack on the U.S., and any President who failed to protect the country in an emergency should be worse than impeached, he should be hanged), there is still the question of how far he will go in his very obvious desire to reduce every international tension he can while searching for a way out of the situation that divides the world into two warring camps.

On 5 April 1954 he said that the hydrogen bomb "was not going to be used by our initiative."

On 30 June he said that the hope of the world lay in peaceful coexistence but that he would "not be a party to any treaty that makes anybody a slave."

On 30 August he warned against the dead ends of both isolationism which would "surrender most of the free world to Communist despotism and ultimately forfeit our own security," and war which "would suddenly place in jeopardy the civilization which we are determined to preserve."

On 2 December he said he would not be pushed into any hasty act—such as a blockade of China—that might precipitate war. But, he said, he would not let the Reds get away with the imprisonment of thirteen Americans as spies. He said his personal feelings of anger and resentment were as great as any other American's, but he believed restraint and patience might mean the difference between an act of war and a chance to avoid war.

THIS last statement probably indicates as clearly as any the President's grand purpose: to exercise restraint and patience and avoid war if honorably possible.

That his purpose seems to him to require a defense effort that emphasizes a "countervailing military power" (thermonukes and heavy bombers?), rather than a revitalized and strengthened Army in being and ready, may perhaps be explained by a statement he made at a press conference on 15 December 1954.

He considered prevention of aggression against vital non-U.S. areas to be a secondary problem, the President said. He had planned a program to meet major defense needs and would rather improvise and resort to expedient in little wars than in big ones. Although he considered distinctions between big and little wars artificial, he felt that if the U.S. could win a big war, it certainly could win a little one.

THE best way to conclude this examination is to return to a statement General Ridgway made on 31 January to the House Armed Services Committee:

"It appears to be obvious, therefore, that a primary means of halting Communist armed encroachment is to maintain combat-ready U. S. Army forces in sufficient strength, suitably deployed, with adequate air and surface transportation and support, for commitment at any threatened point. The consequences of adopting an alternate course, and of decreasing those deployed forces, are, I believe, best described in the following excerpt from the President's message to the Congress on the 6th of January 1955. I quote: 'We must stay alert to the fact that undue reliance on one weapon, or preparation for only one kind of warfare, simply invites an enemy to resort to another. We must, therefore, keep in our Armed Forces balance and flexibility adequate to our needs.' "

MAN: the vital weapon

GENERAL MATTHEW B. RIDGWAY
Chief of Staff, U. S. Army

In recent weeks General Ridgway has sought to convey to the Army his deepest convictions on the importance of the Army to the nation and the high privileges of service. This is the text of his talks before the Armored, Artillery and Infantry Schools. The same talk may be made later at the Antiaircraft and Guided Missile School.

DESPITE the remarkable developments in military technology, despite the weapons and machines which have vastly expanded our striking power, it is still a basic truth that the only absolute weapon is man. Upon his determination, his courage, his stamina, and his skill rests the issue of victory or defeat in war.

I will speak on three principal, related subjects—the role of the Army today; the privilege of service; and the officer-enlisted man relationship.

Wars are won when the enemy's will to continue resistance is broken. History has shown beyond any question that, when the people of a nation believe in the cause for which they are fighting, they will accept defeat only when all reasonable hope for success through continued resistance is lost, when their armed forces have been destroyed, decisively defeated, or rendered impotent.

In other words, the military objective in war is the defeat of the enemy's armed forces. It is vitally important to keep this fact in mind.

The means employed to achieve this objective include attacks upon the enemy's ability to support his armed forces with supplies and equipment, munitions and reinforcements. They probably will include pressures upon the basic economic and social structure of the enemy nation—not as ends in themselves, but because of the effect of such pressures upon the capabilities of the enemy armed forces.

However, it is defeat of those armed forces which must be our ultimate military objective.

The Unpredictable Nature of Warfare

AMONG some circles today, a belief seems to prevail that modern wars may be quickly won by means of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons which will make unnecessary the operations of ground combat forces. This may prove true. Yet no man can today be sure of the nature, duration, or outcome of all-out wars of the future, if such catastrophes should eventuate.

Therefore, taken as an assumed basis for planning, no concept could be more potentially dangerous, perhaps even fatal, than the idea that the war would be over in a few days, weeks, or even months. War can take too many forms and can be characterized by too many surprises for any arbitrary or single promise as to its nature to be warranted. When survival as an independent people is at stake reasonable people will not place their reliance on any single system.

Consider first the situation of a global war. If nuclear weapons were only used strategically—that is, against the fixed facilities and industrial installations of an enemy power—it would still be a considerable time before shortages induced by air attacks upon sources of supply and lines of communication would begin to be seriously felt by enemy forces in the forward areas. Strategic bombardment, in fact, is of military value chiefly for its long-range, not its immediate, effects.

Furthermore, unless the enemy's attacking ground forces were effectively opposed on the ground, they could, by seizure of supplies and facilities in the territory of our allies, replace much of what had been lost in the bombing of their own homeland. That would leave us with the choice of allowing the enemy to keep what he had taken, or of bombing allied territory at an inevitable great cost in lives and property of friendly peoples.

If nuclear weapons were also used tactically, they would find remunerative targets only if enemy ground forces were compelled to concentrate in an effort to break through our own ground defense forces. And if these were too few in strength to compel concentration, we would find only unremunerative targets for our nuclear weapons.

There is also the possibility, in a war occurring some years hence, that atomic and hydrogen weapons might not be used at all, neither opponent being willing to initiate action which could be expected to bring on retaliation in kind. In that case, the role of ground forces would be apparent.

In sum, armies are an essential element in our ability to conduct global war successfully, regardless of whether or not atomic and hydrogen bombs are used.

THE importance of the Army's role in geographically limited wars is equally clear.

Localized aggression tends to occur in underdeveloped regions, and these are usually characterized by mountain or jungle terrain. In such a war, our ability to make effective use of many of our most modern weapons is severely limited.

In Korea, for example, the comparatively undeveloped organization of the country produced relatively little return for the enormous effort we expended in our strategic attacks on the enemy's industry and lines of communication, both of which we literally demolished.

The more primitive a country, the more decentralized it is. Therefore, such a country is much less severely hurt by blows struck primarily at the installations and facilities which in other countries would be its heart, brain, and nervous system. It does not depend on them for its life, as does a more highly organized and integrated enemy.

Conclusive military results against this type of enemy are achieved by destroying or severely damaging the bulk of his fighting forces, and breaking the will to fight of his leadership. All the military services, from the beginning to the end of hostilities, make essential contributions to the achievement of that goal, but ultimately the burden must be shouldered largely by the Army.

SO far I have been talking about the responsibility of military forces to win victory in war. They have, however, a vitally important mission in peace—and that is to provide military capability of such a character that it deters aggressors from resorting to war.

This mission can best be carried out by developing military strength which will give any prospective aggressor serious doubts concerning his chances for success. Because of their potential importance for achieving victory in war, ground forces are vitally important as part of our military strength to deter others from starting war.

Since successful diplomacy depends largely on an ability to negotiate from a position of strength, our military capability is an essential element in the efforts of our statesmen to achieve our foreign policy objectives by peaceful methods.

I do not mean to suggest that technology is not having a marked effect on the Army. New weapons and equipment are giving us vastly greater capabilities. Our present tactics and tactical organization are sure to be materially modified.

You are all aware of the tests and exercises which are being carried out to determine the organizations and tactics which will enable us to realize our capabilities to the fullest extent.

One of the most striking effects will, I think, be the increase in dispersion, both laterally and in depth. We must disperse in order to minimize the effectiveness of mass destruction weapons which may be used against us. At the same time, to exploit the effects of our own



mass destruction weapons against the enemy, we must be able to concentrate rapidly, strike hard, and quickly disperse again.

To do this, we are seeking to develop ever increased mobility and ever improved communications. Of these, much the most vital, is mental mobility throughout our entire chain of command, a freeing of our thinking processes from the paralyzing effects of undue reliance upon past experiences. Something new has truly been added to warfare, and we must meet the challenge of the new with new ways of adapting new weapons and new capabilities to old and unchanging human qualities and the basic principles of war.

These tactical developments will place greater responsibility than ever upon subordinate commanders. Even junior leaders will often have to operate independently and semi-independently. On their initiative and their judgment, no less than on their technical skill in the operation of their equipment, will rest a large part of our hope for victory.

The Soldier's Unconquerable Spirit of Service

THIS now brings me to my next major point, which is that as officers of the Army you are being given as great an opportunity as any to which anyone can aspire —the opportunity for useful service.

Our Nation, with all it stands for, lives under a continuing threat of attack by Godless communism. To the Army, and especially to us as leaders of the Army, falls a vitally important share of the responsibility for maintaining the strength which will prevent the outbreak of war—or, if that is not possible, which will bring us victory.

The rendering of service to the Nation is no imposition upon the individual. It seems to me that all too many people are too prone to concentrate on the comforts, pleasures, and luxuries our way of life makes possible—too remiss in showing forth in their lives a principle they utter with their lips and I believe acknowledge in their minds—the principle of the privilege of serving their kin, their country, and God.

The soldier foregoes many comforts. In place of luxuries he has hardships and often grave danger. Sometimes he is called upon to make the supreme sacrifice and lay down his life for the cause he defends. He knows this. If he is a good soldier he early accepts it fully, unhesitatingly. It becomes basic in his actions in peace and in war.

This spirit is eloquently expressed in the inscription on the monument in Edinburgh to the Scottish-American dead of the First World War. It says: "If it be life that waits, I shall live forever unconquered; if death, I shall die at last, strong in my pride and free."

None of this is new. Sacrifices have been made throughout the history of man. Our national history is replete with them. The history of our Army bears eloquent testimony to the dedication of its members to the ideal of service to others.

Nothing is free. Nothing worthwhile is cheap. The service we perform, the sacrifices we may be called upon to make, constitute the price we must be ready to pay to preserve for the future the blessings of liberty and justice, of human dignity and of individual freedom which have been handed on to us from the past.

SELDOM have military men been afforded more challenging opportunities, more engrossing tasks than those which confront the leaders in our Army today. New weapons in constantly increasing numbers are being made available to the Army. Their mastery requires the application of technical skill and tactical judgment of the highest order. Because we are passing through a period of transition, there is a greater requirement than ever for mental flexibility, for creative imagination, for alert minds. "The orthodox mind maintains and preserves progress—the non-conformist makes progress." The far-flung deployment of Army forces places the Army's officers and noncommissioned officers in the position of ambassadors of our country in many lands and many climes.

And upon the success they attain today in all their varied tasks, may well depend not only the success of our Nation in attaining its objectives, but perhaps even our national survival.

At this point I should like to take a moment to pay tribute to those who serve with the Army in a civilian capacity—from our highest civilian leaders to the hundreds of thousands of loyal and faithful employees without whose contributions the great work of the Army could not go forward.

In particular, we should be proud of our high-principled Secretary of the Army, Robert T. Stevens. His integrity, courage, devotion to duty, and his loyalty to the members of the Army merit our deepest appreciation and support.

The Privileges and Responsibilities of Leaders

NOW I come to the third and last topic I want to discuss—the officer-enlisted man relationship.

Our achievement of success as soldiers is made easier by the high caliber of men and women in today's Army. One of the chief rewards which goes with membership in our officer corps, is the privilege of serving with our enlisted men.

In fact the two most important elements in any army are first its officer corps and second its noncommissioned officer corps.

The soldiers whom we command, like their predecessors throughout our history, have repeatedly proved that, when properly led, they are the finest fighting men in the world. Their intelligence, their enthusiasm, their ingenuity, and their initiative are among our strongest assets. But the responsibility for bringing out these qualities rests squarely upon the officers.

We must ever remember that we are responsible for our men, twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, and that our success as officers rests solidly upon them, and regardless of whether we command a unit, or serve

on a staff. They look to the officer corps for direction, guidance, and example.

It is in the intangible, but vital relationship between officers and men, that leadership becomes an art, not a mere technique. The officer-enlisted man relationship is the foundation stone of sound discipline, the *sine qua non* of morale and *esprit*.

CLOSELY allied to this relationship is the one which exists between the noncommissioned officer and his men. He is the close and indispensable associate of the commissioned officer in the attainment of the Army's objectives. The noncommissioned officer corps, with its professional cadre of career personnel, is of vital importance in achieving the high standards to which our Army aspires.

Just as the officer corps must be the great reservoir of integrity, professional competence, and courageous leadership, so likewise must the noncommissioned officer corps form the great reservoir of character, of devotion to duty, of loyalty, of professional competence that gives strength and substance to our Army. The noncommissioned officer's responsibilities are reflected in the relationship that exists between him and his subordinates.

Coddling has no place in the relationship between leader and subordinate. The soldier is not a child, nor is he an object of pity. He is a colleague to be respected. He is a subordinate to be trained, guided, and directed. He is a fellow American who can teach us much, no matter how many years we have served—a civilian on loan, whose Army service can make him a far better citizen of the future.

Each of us, regardless of rank, must be constantly ready to share in full the discomforts, the hardships, and the dangers which may fall to the lot of our men. This readiness must be something that the men must know they can take for granted. It must rest upon demonstrated acts.

Inexperienced officers sometimes make the mistake of believing that they must court the liking of their men, as though they were taking part in a popularity contest. Nothing could more certainly lead to failure. Respect and consideration for subordinates are essential parts of the good officer's attitude, but they must never overstep that line which dignity, honesty, and firmness dictate, and common sense demands. Character, courage, competence, and consideration will keep us on our side of that indefinable but ever-present line, and under the stresses and tensions of battle, however great, permit us to discharge our responsibilities in keeping with the Army's finest traditions.



The Mutual Respect of Leaders and Followers

THERE is a single principle, a basic interrelationship, underlying the thoughts I have sought to convey to you today. That principle can be expressed in the statement which I made at the outset—that the only absolute weapon is man.

In the final analysis, the form taken by warfare when the struggle becomes one of men against men—as, in the end, it must—is land combat. Only when we close with the enemy on the ground—as only armies can do—can we finally defeat his armed forces, and only by defeating enemy armed forces can we win victory over an enemy nation.

A basic element in our ability to win victory in battle is the relationship between our fighting men and our fighting officers who lead them. That relationship is grounded in the spirit of mutual respect, of mutual confidence, and of mutual understanding, in which discomforts, hardships, and dangers are properly shared, and in which ours can be the greatest reward that anyone can earn—the abiding respect of those who know us best—our comrades and associates.

To the officers and senior noncommissioned officers of the Army is granted the privilege of providing the example, the inspiration, and the leadership through which the Army can continue to perform its vital service to the Nation in peace and in war.

This opportunity for useful, meaningful service is limitless. On the manner in which it is seized and carried out depends a significant share of our country's hope for a future of peace and freedom. No one could hope for a greater opportunity. No one could ask for a finer challenge.

An Interview with General Gavin . . .

THEODORE H. WHITE

MAJOR GENERAL James M. Gavin runs what they call at the Pentagon "a busy shop." His office—he is Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans—seems always on the bubble; it is where the ferment centers.

"Slim Jim" Gavin himself, a lithe and graceful combat soldier of forty-eight, is as reluctant as any man at the Pentagon these days to talk about the Battle of the Budget—whether its cuts may hurt the Army's muscle and strength. But since he is head of the task force that General Matthew Ridgway, Chief of Staff, has assigned to the biggest overhaul job any army has undergone since the Europeans imported the idea of gunpowder from China, his work is obviously central to the great debate. Recently, therefore, I dropped in at the Pentagon for a short talk with the General.

I found him, like most ground soldiers these days, more than somewhat disturbed. In a way all the generals are hoist by the headlines that recent weapon developments have created. The new missiles of war, several capable of being nippled with atomic warheads, are passing rapidly from experimental production into tactical use. The Honest John, a long-range artillery rocket, the Corporal, a longer-range tactical missile, and the 280mm cannon are already firing and ranging in practice not only at Fort Sill, Fort Bragg, and other American training centers but also at our outposts in Europe. What worries the generals is that each time a new technological advance in these weapons is signaled, a fanfare of headlines informs the public that the Army is moving toward "smaller, more mobile units."



Dispersed, but Deep

Which is true, said Gavin, but when you talk of smaller, more mobile units, everyone nods—it's like being in favor of God and motherhood. Actually, as the work of remaking the Army for modern war goes on, it may be that what is needed is bigger forces of smaller units—more men rather than fewer.

For the important thing is to realize that the Russian has the same atomic weapons we have; technologically and tactically he can do to us what we can do to him. And the object of any military exercise is power in the zone of battle, power at point of contact with the enemy. In the last war you figured a breakthrough of about five miles; the depth of the battlefront was, therefore, five miles. But how deep must a modern battle zone be to meet attack with atomic weapons? Say he hits you with half a dozen atomic weapons and comes through fast. The battle zone must be as deep, then, as he can travel with the fuel tanks of his armor full and rolling immediately after the blast. This is the determinant of the battle zone, for he is likely to strike just that deep.

It will take a lot of men to face off the enemy in this new kind of war. Yet not in the density of the old forms of combat, thought Gavin, for all the old forms are too vulnerable to atomic weapons. The problem is simply to find the optimum density of manpower over the optimum depth—enough to hold the enemy on the ground while he is coming in fast, enough to hold him until you organize help and reinforcement for a counterblow.

This means, then, that what we have to do now is take existing forms and repackage them completely, regroup our forms of fire and artillery, reorganize all battle-

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. . . TOMORROW'S BATTLEFIELD

field communications, think through again our means of immediate combat intelligence.

Well, I asked, what does this do to the old division, the kind we fought with in the Second World War and the Korean War?

IN the last wars, said the General, an American division was regularly relied on to hold a front of ten to fifteen miles, quite thick for the first three miles back, tapering off at a depth of five miles. Behind that, nothing but isolated spots of strength.

But now the divisional front will certainly be doubled in length—and how far back in depth it goes no one is certain. We have to think in terms of single-day breakthroughs of 75 to 125 miles in depth. Supposing the Russian throws in a mechanized army of 1,200 or 1,600 tanks; he throws three or four atomic weapons in first; he comes in on the blast; he comes dispersed. What then? Your reaction time determines your survival. He'll come without hesitation just as far as the fuel in his



GENERAL GAVIN SAYS—

The battle zone must be as deep as the enemy can travel with the fuel tanks of his armor full and rolling immediately after the atomic blast.

We are trying to discard old concepts of linear control of the battlefield for one of area control —a problem of controlled dispersion.

Divisional fronts will be doubled in length and how deep no one is yet certain.

We'll have divisions made up of battle groups of two or three thousand men—isolated and dispersed, yet controlled.

For every airplane that goes into combat today, there may be fifty behind doing logistical work, hauling fuel and lubricants, men, or supplies.

Air mobility is the key to battle capability. Tactically we must keep isolated units alive over long periods. Strategically we must be able to deliver power to the zone of battle quickly.

Twenty thousand planes for the Army might indeed not be too many.

Peace can be kept by using our technology to get our forces precisely where we want them.

tanks will carry him until he is stopped by a river or by atomic demolition—or until he is contained by other men.

But, I asked, just how will all this be worked out technically? The new battlefield is all diffuse and scattered. Is it amenable to technical solution?

Never Forget Elephants

Gavin paused for a moment. Always in history, he said, the interesting thing is to see man's reaction to new forms of explosive power. Each new explosive form upsets men into thinking that its destructive power is so great that the battlefield is obsolete, that war is impossible. The Nobel Peace Prize, he pointed out, is almost a symbol. Nobel invents dynamite, of hitherto unknown blasting power; men think that war is now impossible; Nobel bases his Peace Prize on the fortune he makes out of dynamite because war is now unthinkable. Yet what use is dynamite in war today?

Or take elephants, he said. I was puzzled for a moment, but the General went on. He had been reading about elephants and how Hannibal used them against the Romans and what the Romans did. The Carthaginian soldiers looked on their elephants the way our troops looked on tanks—they even named them individually as our men name their tanks. The Carthaginians would paint the rears of their elephants a brilliant vermilion, gather cadavers from the battlefield and impale their guts and parts on the elephants' tusks. Then they would stake the elephants down, goading and prodding them for several days. Then just before battle they would unleash the elephants, which would go trumpeting and screaming into a charge on the Roman ranks. It baffled the Romans until they learned a simple thing—merely to step aside, let the elephants through, and then stick them in the belly and the soft sides.

THE modern battlefield is similarly amenable to technical solution. An amateur strategist might argue that since we have as many atomic weapons as the enemy, the solution is not to try to hold him at all. Simply put a man on every high hill with a radio telephone, five men per square mile, and then wait for the enemy to come through. Your scouts simply report how he comes through and then you counterstrike with atomic weapons of your own. But that won't work because if you hold your front that thinly, the enemy can come through with the lightest forms and simply brush your men aside.

'Battle Groups'

The problem is amenable to solution only with new concepts. What we are trying to do is discard the old concept of linear control of the battlefield for one of area control, said the General. The difficulty is in learning how to control the amorphous mass of men who must be dispersed over an entire zone, an entire tract of land, dispersed thinly enough not to invite bomb blast, yet strongly enough to tackle the enemy who comes on the blast. It is a problem of controlled dispersion. The Army both here and in Germany has been working on the problem intensively, both theoretically and in the field.

This means, said Gavin, that the "monolithic" division of tradition has got to be abandoned. It is too vulnerable to disruption. Instead, the new combat form of the army must be a "cellular" organization—units of two or three thousand men—isolated and dispersed, yet controlled. These new units are smaller than the old regiment of 3,500 men. Tentatively we call them "battle groups." How many the United States Army has now is, of course, classified. But the number is significant. The term "division" will be retained, to be sure, for the organization that binds them to cohesion will still be called a division. But it will be something else, hinged on an entirely new system of communications with new functions. Eventually, as the system and technique develop, the whole Army must be changed over to this pattern, and the National Guard and reserves also.

BUT in sum, I asked, what does this mean—will the Army need more men for the atomic battlefield or fewer? Certainly not fewer, said the General, quite possibly more, almost certainly more. At some point you have to dissolve the organization down to the size of units you are not afraid of losing to one blast. These will be smaller units, but the organization that controls them may require more men; it certainly won't take less men than in the present division. Or take the Eighth Army in Korea. Had that been an atomic war with atomic weapons, with the depth of battlefront required by those weapons, it would certainly have required many more men.

The area and depth of the new battlefront, I pointed out, were something new in the thinking of people like me. Did this concept of area war mean holocaust over vast expanses of ground?

No, said the General; how could he explain it? He reflected, then resumed again. A lot of people talk about the Pax Romana and Pax Britannica as being ages of great peace, the one dependent on land power, the other on sea power. And they say this will be the era of Pax Americana, dependent on air power.

But think about it. How did the Romans keep their peace? Not by having soldiers everywhere but by building roads. The General had traveled over these roads in Italy, in Africa, and Asia Minor—roads running straight as an arrow where the builders wanted them to go. The roads were simply a means of moving men fast, to the area of decision where they could operate at the vitals of the enemy, and that's what the Roman peace was. What was British sea power? It was the means of delivering power, with mobility, where they wanted it. It was the presence of the flag in the harbor, the putting ashore of a few men in a key area, the hanging of a few criminals, that kept the peace where the peace might be disrupted.

Our belief, said Gavin, is that the progress of technology makes it possible to move our forces to impress our will on criminals who disturb the peace, to punish

them, and then be able to move on swiftly to the next area threatened. It's not the idea of using the technology for more destruction but the capability of getting our force precisely where we want it.

Moving by Air

Up to now we had been talking of the battle zone and tactics. The General now switched. He wanted to talk about mobility. Mobility and logistics aren't the least bit glamorous, he said—yet they are of overriding importance. Most people are inclined to think of mobility in terms of weapons. Historically they always depict mobility as combat in battle scenes; in their paintings and their tapestries, it is the picture of the wheeled vehicle or the knight on his charger. Few people really think of mobility as a system of transport that makes action in the battlefield possible. When people think of the Civil War and horses they think of Jeb Stuart without knowing that more horses were used for hauling flour, ammunition, bread, and wounded in an infantry division than in a cavalry division in that war. For every airplane that goes into combat today, there may be fifty planes behind doing logistical work, hauling fuel and lubricants, men, or supplies.

AIR mobility is the key to battle capability today, the ability to deliver men swiftly to the battle zone and support them there. Take the Army in the Far East when the Korean War broke out. Our capability then was limited to flying over only two rifle companies and an artillery battalion to stop the North Koreans. Consider what would have happened had we been able to move a full division by air that first day, parachuting the forward elements to secure the airfields, following with a complete division in twenty-four hours, then another division twenty-four hours later, a third twenty-four hours later still. But we couldn't. We had no mobility.

We need, continued the General, two kinds of air mobility—strategic and tactical. People are inclined to think of air mobility as getting a lot of planes, putting troops in, flying them in, and you have the answer. But air mobility is like amphibious war. You need all kinds of planes—the large soft-bellied transports that bring us supplies and men behind the fire area, the tactical line types (like LCTs and LCIs) to deliver them in the fire area.

You need, for the Army as a whole, at least the capacity of a strategic lift, a corps lift that can lift three divisions from a rear area like Africa to a threatened area like Denmark or the Balkans in twenty-four hours. You can't be strong all over; you must take risks. Only with mobility can you face your risks by lifting your forces to deliver them swiftly where they are needed without scattering them all across the globe six divisions here, six divisions there. And within each theater there should be a tactical lift. The Army in the Far East should have the capacity, say, to lift a single division for tactical purposes, and the same thing applies to Europe.

We generals, said Gavin, are always accused of trying to fight the next war with the weapons of the last. This time we're trying to get ready to fight the next war, if it comes, with the weapons and organization of the next. But until we put our theories to the test in field practice with sufficient equipment, we can't be sure we'll hold.

For the whole character of modern war presumes a basic dependence on air vehicles, not only on parachute drops but on every type of air transport—helicopters, gliders, utility transports. The key to atomic warfare tactically will be how to keep isolated units alive over long periods, still fighting when they are deeply encircled behind enemy lines. The strategy of the globe hinges on our ability to deliver power to the zone of battle quickly.

The New Logistics

An old-fashioned linear war like Korea absorbed only 220 helicopters. We've built more since. We are now experimenting with a few de Haviland Otters, a light utility plane that carries a ton. But no one knows how many the new "area" war or substantial air mobility may require. We need vast reservoirs of planes of varying types. During the Second World War we used the old C-47 all through—but we were developing eight or nine different kinds of new fighters and bombers. Today we need assault transports, brush-hopping transports, amphibious planes, jet assault planes that can come down and take off on water without waiting for clearing a field; we need planes with tracked landing gear.

All this seemed to me to require clouds of planes of shapes and performance I had never dreamed of. I knew, of course, of the transports the Air Force has been developing, from the standard Douglas C-124, which is already operating in group formations, to the new C-132s and C-133s that carry from thirty tons to sixty tons of cargo at a lift, or hundreds of troops at a shot. But Gavin's concept was obviously of an army dependent on and moving in great autonomous fleets of air vehicles of vastly diverse varieties. Would twenty thousand planes be necessary for the new concepts, I wondered?

Gavin, who jumped in with the 82nd Airborne Division on D-Day, recalled that twelve hundred C-47s were used that day in Normandy for support alone. For the new "cellular-type" Army, twenty thousand planes might indeed not be too many. Yet with a sound plan, even this number might be feasible. The Army needs cheap, unsophisticated planes. One complicated B-52, the master strategic bomber, costs $8 million. One group of B-52s costs the equivalent of enough light planes to supply several field armies stoutly enough to hold.

WE did not go on to talk about the debate on Capitol Hill about whether the Army needs more or less money, more or fewer men, more or less research and development. It is civilian leadership that must ultimately decide how the nation is defended in terms of politics, of economics, of strategy. But this leadership cannot do so without being bound by the concrete facts, the limits placed on decision by the stubborn face of the battlefield. And Gavin felt it was best to let the conversation end there.

WHEN is a man too old to lead troops in combat? No one answer will apply to all men. Higher commanders are wisely reluctant to allow the aged, infirm, timid, or tired to command their regiments and battalions. On the other hand, any arbitrary rule that prevents a fit and willing man in his forties from entering combat would be unjust not only to the man but also to the Army. My experience, as a 45-year-old lieutenant colonel, when I tried to get front-line duty during the early days of the Korean conflict, should be as enlightening and surprising to the reader as it was to me at the time.

My desire to volunteer for front-line duty may have been latent for some time. I had brought the 52d Transportation Truck Battalion from Fort Benning, Georgia, to Korea in August 1950. Supporting X Corps in the Inchon landing, my unit went ashore on 26 September 1950 and engaged in port clearance until October, when we moved the 7th Infantry Division across country to Taegu and Pusan.

We supported the 1st Marine Division at Wonsan and Hagaru; the 3rd Infantry Division at Hamhung; and the 7th Infantry Division at Pukchong, Pungsan, Hysenjin, and later at Hagaru and Koto-ri.

On New Year's Eve, when the Communists threatened in the vicinity of Wonju, we hauled the 7th Infantry Division to Yongju, Tanyang, and Chechon. Later, when General Ridgway's Operation KILLER got under way, we hauled ammunition direct to the gun positions in Wonju.

My associates had often hinted, pleasantly enough, that I was an "Infantry" officer and not Transportation Corps. I had been commissioned as an infantryman. Now I wanted to make my crossed muskets mean something. By the time advancing troops had cleared Hongchon in April 1951, I was determined to request front-line duty. This created trouble and personal discomfiture.

No one wanted me. Infantry officers held I was more of a Transportation Corps officer than an infantryman. My basic branch is infantry, but I had also served four years in the Armored Force during World War II. There had been other assignments, too. Others said I had too much rank, or that I was too old.

When I visited G1 of EUSAK, the reply went: "No, I don't see much chance of a reassignment right now. There are about two officers for every job back here. Why, I have a colonel doing the work of a lieutenant or a captain."

"I'm not looking for that kind of a job. How about a line outfit?" I inquired hopefully.

"They've got all the 'reluctant dragons' up there now that they want," was the blunt reply. This uncomplimentary term seems to include overage officers as well as deadwoods. I resented the implication, though it probably was not intended as a personal affront.

"Well, I don't believe I come under that category," I replied, recalling a brief encounter with Communist forces at Su Dong, above Hamhung, when I had assumed command of the 1st Marines regimental trains and led it out next morning. I don't believe those marines would have said I was "reluctant."

"There are a lot of surplus officers," was G1's discouraging reminder.

It was obvious that I wasn't in the pipeline for anything but a dead-end assignment. But I was willing to make another try.

"Suppose I present myself for an interview? Would that be of any value, provided a vacancy exists?" I inquired.

"Maybe, but then they'd probably put someone else in the position if they were reminded of it," was the reply. "Now I could use you in a replacement unit job," he added thoughtfully, as if he had kept this job for a final plug, when all else failed.

"I'm not interested in that kind of job. I have a good outfit."

G1 decided to send me on a round of interviews with division commanders. You may well imagine the depth of my depression when one general officer, in a kindly manner but bluntly, told me I was too old to command a front-line battalion. And that was on my forty-fifth birthday!

The general explained his belief that battalion commanders should be under 38, regimental commanders under 38 or 39, and division commanders under 50. I had to admit, of course, that ten years previously I had been a much better man physically. The general had all the logic on his side as well as the final decision.

An interview with Major General Joseph S. Bradley was the first encouragement I received. He and his assistant division commander, Brigadier General John H. Michaelis, seemed the only ones who shared my enthusiasm. But regimental commanders didn't want me. Too old—I couldn't keep up with younger men.

I concluded that, I should accept an invitation from EUSAK Civil Affairs to join it.

A week later, G1 called to tell me that General Bradley had made a personal request for me. I left immediately for the 25th Infantry Division, then on the Lincoln Line, and was assigned to the 24th Infantry, the last Negro regiment of the Army. Upon reporting, I told General Bradley that I might be a little rusty on infantry tactics but I felt confident that I could get the job done.

"You don't need to know anything about tactics," he announced. "Just get out there on the line and look after the men. Stay right with them all the time." At the time I shook my head in puzzlement, but now I am convinced there was a great deal of wisdom in his statement.

"I'm giving you the 1st Battalion," Colonel Henry Britt, the regimental commander of the 24th, informed me. "And it's the best in the regiment!"

I thanked him and told him I was pleased to become a member of his unit and would do my very best to deserve his confidence. He looked me squarely in the eye and said, "One of the reasons I did not want you in my regiment is because I don't think you are an infantryman!" I returned his look for a moment and replied, "Colonel, if anything happens in my unit, I'll be around!"

I ENJOYED my command from the very first day, although there was a shortage of company officers—one per company for a few days. When I mentioned my concern over the shortage of officers, the regimental commander drew me aside and said, "Them as think they can't get along with the officers they have usually find themselves back in Civil Affairs sections!"

"I'll get along!" I replied.

Survey of my troops indicated that I had a lot of replacements. On one occasion I found a BAR man who did not know how to operate his weapon.

"How long have you been in this unit?" I inquired.

"Three days, sir."

Investigation revealed that most of my BARs were in the hands of replacements. Evidently, being a replacement



Not all battalion commanders are

OVERAGE AT 45

COLONEL WALDON C. WINSTON

was considered ample qualification to become a BAR man!

In a few days I had set up a BAR range in a river bed within my right sector. There was plenty of room, so we improvised a combat course and a machine-gun range. I rotated men through these ranges as fast as I could. I obtained permission to go through our wire barricade and to conduct live platoon problems against a hill in front of our position.

When the 25th Infantry Division moved north toward the 38th parallel in May, the 24th Infantry moved out with them. And an "old man" led the 1st Battalion!

At Sopa-ri, the 1st Battalion dislodged the Chinese from Hill 417 on 25 May. The next day, it was the 1st Battalion that made a lightning thrust of twelve and a half miles to the 38th parallel through mud, rain, and sniper fire, without air or road reconnaissance for the last half of the push. We captured forty to fifty prisoners, and at dark we were about 5,000 yards out in front of units on either flank. There we went into a perimeter of defense for the night. An "old man" was at the head of the column that day and on foot during that action.

The 24th Infantry was inactivated about 1 October 1951, and my days as a battalion commander were over. On Colonel Britt's departure from the regiment I received a strange accolade. I had expressed my special sentiments for the opportunity to serve under him, when he said, "Do you know why I accepted you into my regiment?"

I shook my head.

"It was because of your handshake!" he answered.

MY next assignment was as executive officer of the 35th Infantry. Here I had an opportunity to engage in the administrative activities of a regiment, as well as do my share of inspecting and supervising front-line units. On two different occasions, for about eight days each time, I commanded the regiment in the absence of the regimental commander. On each occasion, we had some very lively patrol action. But at no time did anyone check my birth certificate.

It is my proud conviction that my superiors never had cause to regret their decision to use me. Naturally, I tried hard to deserve that confidence and to earn the respect of my own officers and men. I have been rewarded for my efforts. One lesson I have learned is that if you really want something out of life, regardless of your age, you must be willing to fight for it.

High-Angle Destroyers

No matter how well the enemy digs in, high-caliber artillery mortars will be able to get at him

LIEUTENANT COLONEL BIDWELL MOORE

WE have often found ourselves fighting on rough, easily fortified terrain, over ground that is costly to take. Sicily, Italy, certain Pacific Islands and, more recently, Korea are good examples. In these places the infantry had a heartbreaking and bloody time dislodging determined enemies from well-fortified positions atop commanding heights.

Ordinary artillery and fighter-bombers are our present solution to the difficulties on this type of terrain. Yet the high casualty figures show all too starkly the inadequacy of our current methods for reducing a strongly intrenched enemy.

Let us consider a modern solution to the problem. Heavy-artillery-type mortars such as Germany used with excellent effect in World War I at Verdun and in World War II at Leningrad are the key to this kind of warfare. The Germans never took these two heavily fortified localities, but that was not the fault of the mortars.

Few of us seem to know that the U. S. also has built artillery mortars. In 1944, a 914mm giant, the largest mortar ever, was actually built. Known as "Little David," this weapon fired a 3,700-pound shell. It had a 38-ton tube that was 6 calibers long, a maximum range of 10,000 yards, and a muzzle velocity of 1,200 ft/second. It was towed into action and its concrete base, weighing 47 tons, was treated as an expendable item when the mortar displaced. It was designed to destroy heavily fortified enemy positions and installations, but the war ended before it was used.

German artillery mortars were rifled, breech-loading cannon which, like infantry mortars, were fired at a high angle. Modern, slimmed-down, self-propelled versions of these titans, firing their projectiles of a ton and more, could accurately and effortlessly have reduced the well-made fortifications of the Japanese and Red Chinese in the Pacific and in the Far East. In addition to high explosive, napalm or some comparable filler could have been used with great effect.

These mortars have a hitting power unknown to conventional field artillery. Even our 240mm howitzer, with its 360-pound shell, is not in the same league with the German behemoths, firing their 2,249-, 3,310-, and 4,400-pound projectiles. These last two projectiles, incidentally, were fired from self-propelled weapons.

In addition, artillery mortars have an accuracy that the fast-flying plane can never match. Remember Monte Cassino? There, not even our heavy bombers succeeded in dislodging the German defenders. And artillery projectiles are quite immune to flak as they are to bad weather and low ceilings.

In the box in the columns below are listed some of the big mortars used by the Germans in World War II. The characteristics cited are an indication of what we can do with these weapons. Earth-and-log intrenchments of the kind ordinarily encountered in the field simply could not live in the face of fire from such mortars. With the possible exception of the 420mm weapon, the cannon listed below are admittedly too heavy for modern purposes; however, that is easily remedied. Cut the projectile weight to 1,500 pounds, keep the range at about 15,000 yards, and reduce the caliber to 400 millimeters. The tube length should be 15 calibers, plus or minus 1.

The final product, including self-propelled mount, should not exceed 40 tons.

Using artillery mortars makes sense economically too. They would cost considerably less than modern tactical bombers. One or two battalions of six pieces each would be assigned to each corps, and they could be concentrated at critical points to meet the needs of particular situations. The mortars could fire an atomic shell if necessary. In their ordinary role, they could be used with devastating effect on enemy artillery. The artillery mortar would be a counter-battery weapon that would not merely silence enemy artillery, but would actually destroy it! Its low muzzle velocity would mean long tube life; and when the time does come for a new bore, ease of field replacement could be "built in."

Self-propulsion and modern design can lift these powerful weapons from the dust heap back into valuable and necessary service. Given mobility and improved characteristics, they will prove a priceless life-saver to infantry troops faced with the necessity of digging out a determined, well-dug-in enemy.

	420mm Gamma Mortar (16.5")	540mm Karl Mortar (21.25")	615mm Karl Mortar (24.21")
Length of tube	16 calibers	10 calibers	8 calibers
Weight in action	15.43 tons[1]	132 tons	132 tons
Maximum range	15,530 yards	13,000(?) yards	6,200(?) yards
Muzzle velocity	1,483 ft/sec	(?)	(?)
Projectile weight	2,249 pounds	3,310 pounds	4,400 pounds
Motivation	towed	self-propelled	self-propelled

[1]Source book is probably in error here. The World War I version of this mortar, which was probably substantially the same as its World War II counterpart, weighed 51 tons in action, while its tube alone accounted for 16.1 tons.



The Army built this 914mm mortar during World War II for use against the Siegfried Line, but it never saw action



"Dropping" a shell down the mortar's muzzle was a job for John Bunyan

Life Can Be Beautiful Before You're Forty

The Facts About 118 Colonels

COLONEL RALPH E. PEARSON

PROMOTION by selection is working. But you have to demonstrate ability, to win a promotion made possible for outstanding officers by the Officer Personnel Act of 1947.

Permanent promotions since 1947 do not demonstrate as strikingly as temporary promotions the changes that have taken place since World War II. A group of young officers, who had been temporary general officers during World War II, were moved ahead of their contemporaries to permanent colonel in 1948. But mostly the permanent promotion plan eliminated the unqualified, or dropped them behind their contemporaries. Permanent grade, however, is not the important factor today. Today most officers, Regular or Reserve, have a temporary grade higher than their permanent commission.

Before World War II, Regulars moved up by seniority, and except for promotion to general officer, you usually had only to wait for a vacancy to make your "number." Disciplinary action sometimes resulted in a loss of a number of "files." That was important then. There was practically no temporary promotion, except during World War I[1], and the number of slots for higher grades was definitely limited.

Arguments in favor of promotion by selection include two points which are often heard in discussions of leadership in the Army. One is that officers should serve for a time in the ranks, and the other that what we need is younger men in responsible assignments; trained men of proved ability, but not necessarily those of the greatest "years of service." Promotion by selection was designed to keep good men moving to the top and the required number of years for permanent promotion was reduced for all grades. Provision was also made for temporary promotion on an Army-wide basis, not necessarily on the basis of occupying a T/O vacancy.

To see how the plan is working and what officers get promoted, a survey was made of the lower two-thirds of the Regular Army list. The temporary colonels were selected as a sample.

STARTING with the class of 1939 of the USMA[2], and considering all Regular Army officers to the end of the list, we find (at the time this study was made, late in 1953) that there were 118, who with less than fifteen years of service, were wearing eagles on their shoulders.[3]

These officers have been selected on the "best qualified" basis, for the present

[1] After World War I, all officers were reduced to their permanent grade at one time. In 1922 all officers actually had their permanent grade reduced, by legislation, because of a limitation on funds. The Eisenhowers and the Bradleys were reduced in permanent rank after struggling for years to get promoted. Many an officer was a company commander for 15 years or more.

[2] The class of 1939 completed 15 years service in 1954, technically half of a normal career under current rules. The 118 officers studied here averaged 39 years of age—born in 1915. That was the year Eisenhower, Bradley, Van Fleet and a whole host of World War II general officers graduated from West Point. So these young colonels of 1954 were babes in arms when our World War II leaders were beginning their careers.

[3] This would never have happened in any other period of comparable length. There was a time in the late 1940s when temporary eagles of the class of 1931 or younger were demoted. The rule in the Army then (and now) was, "Permanent captains cannot be temporary colonels." The class of 1931 had more than 15 years of service at the time, but officers were normally promoted to major after seventeen years of service prior to OPA 1947.

grade, by boards operating under the Officer Personnel Act of 1947. They were selected on the basis of their ability and training demonstrated during one of the most active periods in the history of the U.S. Army.[4] During this period, the book of rules for personnel management had been changed. Prior to 1947 there were only 700 vacancies for permanent colonels allotted to the "line." But now grade is no longer based solely on age and service.

Today we have new rules for everything, almost, and a lot of talk about making the Army more attractive. It still is not the era of "push button" warfare, nor can one get to be the top man in the Army, or outside, without demonstrating top ability, generally in more than one field. There is plenty of opportunity in today's Army.

IT is interesting to note first, the distribution by branch of these men whose names may be future household words, famous in the days of our sons. The numbers by branch who have made the temporary rank of colonel seem to follow pretty much what we would expect in a period of warfare and martial emergency.

Almost half of the officers are of the Infantry. About 20 per cent are Field Artillery, and when CAC and FA are considered as "Arty" you have 25 per cent of the total. More than 13 per cent are Armor, with the Engineers close behind with 10 per cent. Engineers are supposed to be the brainiest, but the infantrymen seem to have the greatest opportunity to make good or to get quick relief.

WHILE these men have made a record in the field as demonstrated by the more than 500 awards they have won for their work, they have also taken time out for some serious study.[5] Most of them have already completed the work at the Command and General Staff College, labeled as graduate work by many familiar with educational standards.[6] Fifteen have already graduated from the Armed Forces Staff College and one from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.[7]

When not in the schoolroom, and most of this group have spent considerable time there, for many have also completed courses at branch schools prior to C&GSC, these men have been doing things. More than a third of them served as enlisted men. They were evidently willing and able to do what they asked their men to do. Not only have they been awarded 18 Distinguished Service Crosses, a Distinguished Service Medal, five Soldier's Medals, and 67 Legions of Merit, but while accumulating these they have won almost a Silver Star apiece. Every other one of them has a Purple Heart.

And while doing their stint in the field and classroom since Pearl Harbor days, these officers have garnered almost two Bronze Star Medals apiece, and if you add the Commendation Ribbon, the average is well above two each. These medals are considered tops by most of the men whose permanent rank was recently that of captain.

And just to prove that these officers represent a cross section of America, and that what they have done can be done by others with ability and willingness to work, I note that the young colonels were born in 41 States, the District of Columbia, Territory of Hawaii, and the Philippine Islands. I must add that more than 25 per cent of these gentlemen come from the "Ole South, suh."

[4]Most of these officers are believed to have been promoted to the grade of temporary Lt. Col. prior to 1 Jan. 1945, *i.e.*, during World War II.

[5]Of the 25 graduate degrees from civilian schools, more than half are held by Engineers.

[6]Others were probably in the 1952-53 and 53-54 classes.

[7]Some members of this group also attended the Strategic Intelligence School, Air War College, Canadian ASC, Army and Navy Staff College, British Staff College, and the Naval War College as well as the Air Command and Staff College.

	Year of Birth	Infantry	Field Artillery	Coast Artillery Corps	Armor	Corps of Engineers	Chemical Corps	Ordnance Corps	Signal Corps	Total
AGE & BRANCH	1910				1					1
	1913	3			3	1	1			8
	1914	12	10	2	2	4	1		1	32
	1915	20	6	1	2	3	1	1	1	35
	1916	18	6	3	7	1		1		36
	1917	1	1		1	2				5
	1918	1								1
		55	23	6	16	11	3	2	2	118
										AVERAGE AGE: 39
EDUCATION	ICAF									
	AFSC	7	4	3			1			1
	C&GSC	43	19	6	16	4	3	1	1	15
	Graduate Degrees	3	4	1	2	13	2		1	93
	USMA	33	13	4	11	10		1		25
	AB	8	3		1					72
	BS	9	5	1	5	2	3		2	12
										27
										UNDERGRADUATE DEGREES: 111
DECORATIONS	DSM	1								
	DSC	15			2	1				1
	SM	1	1		2	1				18
	SS	68	7	1	12	6	2			5
	LM	28	15	3	8	7	2	2	2	96
	BSM	116	39	4	24	14	3	3		67
	PH	34	7	2	11	5	2			203
	CR	20	6	6	4	2	1	1	1	61
	AM	5	4		1					41
		288	79	16	64	36	10	6	3	10
Enlisted Service		24	10	1	2	3	1			502
										41

Chart prepared by the author from The Army Register, 1 January 1953

. . . Very Important Men

MAJOR MELVIN GARTEN



NCO students learn public speaking by actually giving classroom lectures

You could say that "prestige is as prestige does" and at the Fort Bragg NCO Academy noncommissioned officers have their self-respect and dignity raised to a plane that merits the respect of subordinates as well as superiors and gives this corps of Very Important Men the prestige they must have

THE men who operate the "Fort Bragg NCO Academy," which offers a four-week curriculum to a hundred students, agree with their contemporaries all over the world on one important premise: that the U. S. Army noncom is a very important man. They aim not merely to instruct, but also to enhance the dignity and raise the prestige of the Army's corps of noncommissioned officers.

The very first hour, at an official greeting, the students are told of the Academy's policies. They are congratulated on their selection for attendance and are informed that so long as the "trust and confidence," symbolized by their stripes, is not belied, they will be treated with the respect and dignity commensurate with their rank.

Then the curriculum begins. Throughout the course, inspections are held daily. These inspections are strict, designed to show the student how to inspect his men and their barracks.

The purpose of the physical training and dismounted drill classes is to teach the student how to instruct. While these courses do improve the individual's performance, he is made to feel that he is being drilled as a leader and not as a private in the ranks.

One feature of the mess is the "training table," where overweight students can voluntarily follow a menu whose calories and carbohydrates are carefully controlled. The diet is under the supervision of the post surgeon, and all foods are from the regular-issue rations. Some students have dropped as much as twenty-five pounds during the four weeks of the course.

Eight hours are given to "liaison visits" during which the class visits each of the post's installations and is given a thirty-minute tour and explanation of each organization. Included in these tours are the Psychological Warfare Center, the post bakery and meat-cutting plant, the post stockade, the quartermaster repair shops, the signal center, the engineer brigade, the helicopter battalion, the military intelligence group, and the artillery.

All students sleep in barracks. This measure is not too popular with married men, but it is a necessary part of the academic life. A vigorous off-duty program is constantly in progress. In the day room, there is a billiard and ping-pong tournament; an off-duty education program is conducted in the classrooms; in the coffee shop a student can learn to play chess or bridge; in the auditorium he can see the Army's 16mm films ranging from "The Platoon in Attack" to pictures of the prize fights. Pressure is not brought to bear to keep students in the Academy area after retreat, but if they desire to remain, their time can be pleasantly and profitably spent.

THROUGHOUT the year, NCOs at Fort Bragg are targets for a public relations program that is designed to make the NCO proud he is attending or has attended the Academy, and to stimulate the interest of potential students.

This campaign is conducted through newspaper articles and other media, including a fifteen-minute radio program that was recently broadcast over all local stations. A television show and a twenty-minute film are also in the works.

In each day room on the post are posters describing the Academy as "the stepping stone to promotion." The Academy periodically has a luncheon for all commanders, where problems of NCO training are discussed. One month all of the battalion commanders, the post commander and his general staff, and the corps artillery commander and his staff attended a luncheon. The next month, all the first sergeants received the same courtesy. It is planned to invite all the company and battery commanders and their executive officers.

Guest speakers are frequently invited to address the students. In one class, the judge advocate's section was represented by Lieutenant Colonel Robert Ivey, who discussed "Military Justice and the NCO"; the provost marshal, Lieutenant Colonel Eugene Carson, presented "The Responsibilities of the NCO"; the commander of the 66th Signal Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Willis E. Kooken, talked on "Customs of the Service"; and the TI&E officer and the adjutant general had their say in their respective fields.

A formal graduation dance is held before the commencement exercise of each class. All students, their wives, and their guests are invited. There they meet General Joseph P. Cleland, the Commanding General, and Mrs. Cleland, and Brigadier General Paul R. Weyrauch, Commanding General of XVIII Airborne Corps Artillery, and Mrs. Weyrauch, in a receiving line. Incidentally, this is one of the first integrated dances sponsored in this part of the country. Music by a good band, a cheerfully decorated auditorium, and punch with cookies provide the background.

Graduation is a formal ceremony complete with distinguished speakers, unit colors flying, band, and chaplain. The students who finish at the top are presented individually inscribed awards and certificates of achievement.

Letters of commendation for the credit they have reflected on their parent unit are sent to their commanding officers.

The commissioned instructors of the Academy are young but well-trained officers. They understand that to teach leadership they must be exemplary in their own individual performance. They do all they can in the classroom and during breaks and off-duty hours to impart to the students the idea of leadership and instruction by personal example.

The Army does not want leaders who have to bluster, threaten, or cajole to get their orders obeyed. It needs leaders who are quiet-spoken and whose word is law. It is believed at the Academy that the quiet-spoken order invoking com plete, cheerful obedience emanates naturally from the NCO whose character gains strength through "dignity and prestige." His type of leadership has worked in the past, is effective now and will be necessary in the future. It will always mean the difference between a successful and a defeated army.



Mission completed. A sergeant receives his diploma from the commandant




NCOs are taught that care and maintenance of weapons are fundamental

ANOTHER JOB FOR THE ARMY

COLONEL

WILLIAM B. BUNKER





GUARDING THE HOME FRONT

"We are in a better position to defend Paris, or Luxembourg, or Stuttgart, or Munich, than we are to protect Wilmington or Portland," says this soldier in arguing that battle damage control of our cities in thermonuclear war is too big a job for any organization except the Army.

THE true meaning of the traditional conservatism of the military mind is that defeat is too permanent to be risked on radical new ideas no matter how attractively they may be packaged. Mutual annihilation cannot be a complete program of defense for the next war. Therefore, we are forging a globe-girdling concert of land armies with our traditional allies, and even our erstwhile foes, to hold back a mass overland assault by the enemy's ground forces.

But will the next war end with traditional ground armies locked together in a desperate struggle, killing one another in a more or less retail fashion with rifles and bayonets while their homelands are being disintegrated in awesome mushroom clouds? If the nation has been annihilated into atomic dust, what are the armies fighting for? It would appear to be of little importance to the evaporated government if an invading army should occupy its smouldering, radioactive ruins. The purpose of land warfare has been to defeat the enemy forces in order that his territory may be occupied and the victor's will imposed upon the government and the people of the vanquished nation. But if there is no vanquished people, if the enemy's government has been eliminated and his industrial complexes atomized, what then becomes the mission of an army?

If a major segment of the industrial potential or the political management of a country is eliminated instantaneously and completely, will not the effect on its army leaders and troops be equally disastrous? If the capital of a country and a major portion of its civil and military leaders are eliminated, will the armies continue on their plodding way protecting the empty ruins of their cities and towns?

Since the introduction of the strategic bombing concept into warfare it is moot to ask if the basic objective of war is still the destruction of the enemy's ground forces and the occupation of his territory. In both world wars we repeatedly announced that we did not wish to destroy the opposing peoples but only their unacceptable governments, and the portent of what "occupation" has really become can plainly be seen in the recent occupations of Germany and Japan. Armies have become forces for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the conquered territory, police forces to maintain a semblance of law and order until acceptable indigenous civil authorities can be reconstructed.

THERE appears to be a large void in this picture of future conflict, when viewed in the abstract. If we are in fact to have a war of nation against nation, and if the enemy, as he must, recognizes that the decisive straw in the balance is the industrial potential of the United States, sooner or later that war will take the form of a wholesale bombing attack on the industrial, population, and political centers of this country. There is no validity in the assumption that an international forswearing of atomic and thermonuclear weapons would alter this pattern. Our military forces should certainly be deployed to protect the most important facilities and installations exposed to attack. It seems that perhaps, in taking the long view of the importance of a free Europe to our continued existence, we have forgotten that the survival of our own people is even more vital. Our military plans discuss the movement and deployment of large bodies of troops to the scene of operations with the automatic assumption that these operations will be in Europe. We are building and maintaining a strong navy in order

Civil defense was the job of these Army-trained British Home Guards in World War II. In a thermonuclear war our Army may be called upon for a similar role





An enemy attack would cause utmost disorganization, misery, and damage in dense population centers like Chicago

to be able to keep our troops and our allies overseas well supplied with food and the munitions of war while they are under attack by the enemy. We are doing nothing, however, for those who will actually be most exposed to the thermonuclear power of the enemy—the people of the United States itself.

WHAT role can armies play in such a conflict? Should it not be the protection of the target area from the effects of the enemy action? Rather than waiting in trenches and battlements for hordes of enemy soldiers to come swarming in for the final blow, would they not better serve the nation by preparing to limit the effects of his attack? Is not the Army's mission, in the terminology of the Navy, one of battle-damage control rather than of waging a fruitless struggle in the mud for some European farmland?

The fact remains that destruction of enemy soldiers is the final objective of ground warfare and all our weapons and doctrines are devised to murder as many persons as efficiently as possible. In discussing the strategy and doctrine of aerial bombardment we still claim that the objective is the destruction of industrial facilities, political records and buildings, transportation, or some other inanimate target. But the crude and brutal truth is that the objective most often becomes the destruction of the people who operate facilities—or at the least, to convince them that unless they evacuate the area or give up the target they will be killed. Certainly this can be the only justification for using a weapon that must devastate five hundred square miles in order to damage a few acres of factory. It is clear that in the Air-Atomic Age the primary purpose of war has in fact become the destruction of not only the facilities but also the people of the enemy's homeland. Our military defensive doctrine should be fashioned to give more conclusive recognition to this fact.

AS the almost unimaginable power of the new weapons to be used against them has begun to be publicized, civil populations have once again started to form mutual protective forces. Air-raid drills are held in factories and schools, shelters are marked on buildings, informational notices are published on television and radio, and low-priced books on civil defense are available to alerted citizens. A network of civil defense organizations is being laboriously constructed all over the nation, and a school for its leaders and local instructors has been established near Washington. Slowly it is being pressed into the consciousness of Americans that the next war

may well begin—and perhaps end—in their factories or office buildings and that they are the ones who will have to do the real combat with the enemy, not their conscripted military forces.

Unfortunately, they may also be deciding that this could never happen to them or, even worse, that there is nothing effective for them to do about it. This is the same disregard of personal disaster that has led men to explore the uncharted oceans, climb the highest mountains, and—yes, even invent the airplanes and devise the bombs that have brought us to this crossroad in the history of humanity on our planet. Such an attitude, valorous in other contexts, is what makes it difficult to organize a civil defense unit or to sell hurricane insurance.

If the battlefields of the next war are to be Washington, Detroit and Milwaukee; if we are to be precipitated into war by attacks on Los Angeles or St. Louis or New York, perhaps we should be thinking more seriously about deploying our organized military forces to defend those targets more effectively. Today we are in a better position to defend Paris, or Luxembourg, or Stuttgart, or Munich, than we are to protect Wilmington or Portland. Yet the known resources of the enemy make him capable of striking almost any city or town in the United States, and his ability to complete such an attack is increasing with every passing day. It is true that we have a Continental Air Defense Command and have stationed units of interceptors to protect the airways into our vital areas. We hope that the screens of electronic observers and ground sentinels stretching from the Arctic wastes to the interior of our land will make it possible for us to detect the approach of the enemy in time to give some degree of warning and to launch our counter-attack. However, we readily admit that some of the attackers will be able to get into the target area. In fact, can we not say that since such defenses are never fully effective until they have been put to work, a larger than normal share of the first attackers will probably be able to deliver their lethal cargos? Since it is quite impossible to tell at the North Pole what city of the United States has been selected for the American Hiroshima, the defensive net will not be able to give a warning with certainty. Many people will ignore the screaming sirens as just another practice warning. Around many of our cities we have stationed ground batteries not only of conventional antiaircraft artillery but also the latest guided missiles for a surface-to-air defense; but even these measures can offer the reassurance of only a partial coverage, a "leaky umbrella" sort of defense.

THE arrival of war on the home front will put everyone in the area of the target in direct personal danger. No longer does the bomb affect only those in the building that happens to be hit, but everyone in the city. If he survives, man's first thought will be to extricate himself and perhaps his nearest neighbor; his second thought will be to find and care for his family; his next will be to get away from the area of lingering radioactive contamination. He would not be able to move into an area of greater damage to render assistance or to start the job of reconstruction. And if the aim of the attack was to stop the industrial or governmental processes of the area, the survivor would be actually aiding the enemy in the accomplishment of his mission when he leaves his work and goes to the assistance of the less fortunate. The time has come to turn the problem of home defense over to professionals who can be trained to handle the increased complexities of the job, who can be given the equipment they require, and who will thereby leave the ordinary citizen free to protect himself and continue doing his part in the nation's war effort. We are leaning on a bent reed indeed if we think that the vehicles, fire equipment, medical facilities, and other resources of our cities will be able to carry the primary responsibility for overcoming the chaos of even a "small" hydrogen bomb in a city or industrial area. The stirrup pump and white helmet of World War II are as outmoded as the hand-drawn fire pumper and the bucket brigade.

BUT, with the largest peacetime budget for armed forces and their equipment of any nation in the history of the world, how can we do more to protect ourselves on this third battlefield? Our land, sea, and air leaders are already advising that any further budget reductions will weaken them dangerously and that they cannot meet increasing obligations with smaller forces. We have already decided that since we cannot determine when, where, or how the next war will begin or be fought, we cannot be completely prepared for any type of combat but must accept a compromise which does not leave us completely vulnerable. The need for an equipped and trained home-defense force cannot be answered by robbing strength from our retaliatory Strategic Air Force, our antiaircraft and interceptor defensive systems, our naval forces, or our ground armies to protect the frontiers of our allies.

If a large-scale expansion of our current military establishment is the only answer to this problem, there is serious question if we could afford it no matter how important it might seem. The choice then would be that of withdrawing from the responsibility of protecting the territory of our friends and allies and concentrating our resources on protecting the targets which we feel will be the primary ones and which we know will be the most important to our own citizens. This is impossible and unthinkable in an era when only a few hours separate the farthest corners of the globe. The range from Moscow to Washington is less for today's weapons than was the seventy miles to Paris for the "Big Bertha" of World War I. Our problem becomes one of trying to generate a professional civil defense organization without increasing our military forces or their budgets, without withdrawing our deployed tactical and strategic forces and without decreasing our ability to wage war under either the new or the old concept. It is a problem in gratis self-levitation.

There is an indication of what can be the answer to this dilemma in the events of the Battle of Britain and in the sequence of operations in World War II. After their initial success in France, the Germans unleashed



America's ability to survive a thermonuclear attack will depend largely on the resourcefulness and good sense of her citizens. College students in the Washington area recently staged a practice evacuation. Using portable survival equipment, they slept *(above)* and prepared food for themselves *(below)* in the woods of Maryland



a sample of this new type of war on the British Isles. The success with which the British people withstood these assaults and continued to carry forward the necessary functions of their economy and their government is an indelible tribute to the courage and fortitude of the people. The effectiveness of their civil defense organization undoubtedly accounted for a large measure of this success, but the availability of trained and disciplined army units which had been evacuated from the Continent gave an essential solidity to this force that may well have been decisive. The transportation, engineering, and demolition equipment of the military units, while not specifically designed for this use, were invaluable in assisting in the limitation of bomb-damage effect and compensated for the inadequacy of municipal equipment. Although the primary function of these troops and those of the Allies who were being assembled on the Isles was to invade the continent of Europe and destroy the enemy's ground armies, it was quite obvious that such operations could not be undertaken while the foe could exercise his aerial strength at will. During those days the enemy was the German bomb, and the British Army as well as the Royal Air Force was deployed to combat it. In spite of the inability of air interdiction to hobble the forces of the Communists in Korea, it is not likely that a major land war could be conducted successfully on European battlefields until some semblance of air superiority had been gained by our forces. Of what value would it be to establish a defensive position on the Elbe after months of combat, if the enemy could wipe it out in a few seconds?

OUR ground forces under present planning will consist of thirteen "mobile" divisions, plus five "static" divisions, a number of smaller units and service elements. Of these, approximately one half will be deployed in areas where we expect they might be called upon to fight, while the rest are held in training and reserve within the continental limits of the country. In addition, we have a number of Army Reserve units which are kept in a state of partial preparedness by weekly drills and annual maneuvers and can be organized into combat units in a minimum of time should an emergency arise. Then we have the National Guard units, which constitute another reserve. The primary mission of all the domestically stationed units in peacetime is to be as well trained and equipped as possible in order to be able to take the field in the shortest possible time.

There is some doubt whether our ground forces will ever be used for the purpose for which they are being trained and equipped. Because of the limitations of personnel, housekeeping commitments and other problems, Regular Army units in this country could not be expected to be able to move out for a foreign battlefield in less than three weeks and most probably it would take considerably longer; it would take several months to assemble the shipping and escorts needed to move them to an overseas theater. Reserve units would take a longer period, and it is doubted if the National Guard could effectively participate in a modern war in less than from nine months to a year. Even this unhappy schedule is far faster than that of the first two World Wars. But, assuming that this country will be attacked by atomic and hydrogen bombs from the opening days of the war until our retaliatory forces have convinced the aggressor that this tactic is a poor exchange or until our defensive forces have whittled his potential down to a sufferable limit, the critical phase of the war for the people of the United States and their government and industrial might will probably be the first few weeks of the war. Perhaps we will not even be able to stand the second day of this type of warfare unless we are far more prepared to cope with it than we seem to be today.

THE home forces of our army must protect the people, the government, and the facilities of the United States while we are using our air power to protect our shores and deliver the counterblow. The enemy for the people on the ground in this phase of a war is not a foot soldier with his weapon, but a thermonuclear monster which is attacking the nation's heart. It is essential that the manpower which our national policy requires us to keep

under arms and organized into armies be used directly against the enemy which is threatening our people and hence our government. Our government reflects, even in times of war, the will of our people; we have no fanatic dictator who will keep the war going while the nation crumbles around him. Unless the people are protected and assisted, our war effort will collapse in its first days in spite of our military strength. Only by using our armed forces to keep the enemy's force from being felt too severely by the people can we continue on the arduous road to victory.

I cannot discuss here all the steps which must be taken in the organization, training, and equipping of our army to make it an effective force for this home defense role. Such problems must be resolved as the details of civil and military relationships, availability of funds, personnel and equipment, and other problems are explored. There are, however, a few basic steps that must be taken for such a plan to be effective. Most important, it must be recognized that this has become the primary mission for the forces stationed in this country and that, if need be, training for ground combat in the familiar pattern must be sacrificed. Our troops must be more widely dispersed, so that there is at least a regiment in the reasonable vicinity of each major target area, even though in recent years we have found it more efficient and economical to gather our regiments in large units in areas removed from our population centers. We will have to reestablish area military commands which are closely coordinated with the local civil authorities, with military planners working daily with municipal and industrial leaders on plans for the disaster. The system of authorities to be reestablished will have to be prepared in advance so that leadership does not vanish just when it is needed most. We will have to establish large military encampments well away from the danger area, capable of housing, feeding and giving medical attention to thousands of evacuees on a minute's notice; it is certainly fallacious to expect that the refugees from Washington will be cared for in the normal civil facilities of Baltimore when that city or its neighbor on the other side may be the next target.

WE think of disasters in terms of the fires, earthquakes and floods which happen once and then give us time to recuperate. But certainly the mercy of Nature cannot be expected of man. Army units will have to be equipped with ample transportation—trucks, ambulances, and especially with helicopters—in order to carry out evacuation, resupply and rescue operations. The loss of local transportation equipment and facilities will be a most crippling factor. Special engineering equipment will be required for the rapid replacement of water and power services and for clearing the essential arteries of movement. All these are problems which the Army is normally trained and equipped to handle. Army units must be well organized and disciplined and ready in an instant to assume the responsibility.

It is an accepted policy for the Army to assist civil authorities in times of disaster, but some will argue that this complete reorientation of mission carries the concept too far. But when this new war strikes, there will be

Fire fighting and preservation of order were everyday tasks for the British Army and Home Guard during Hitler's blitz





British civil defense workers search for victims of a German World War II flying bomb in a suburb of London

no time for consultation between military and civil leaders to find out how much assistance is needed; indeed, there may well be no one to consult. The Army's responsibility and authority must be well defined if the defense is to be timely and effective. The detailed plans must be all finished, the reconnaissances all made, and the commands functioning smoothly or the need for them may vanish before the tool can be fashioned.

THE mission of limiting the effects of the enemy attack must be assigned as the first duty of the Army, and "civil defense" made an integral part of the Department of Defense. The Army must organize area commands that have authority over all units of the Regular, Reserve, and National Guard establishments in these areas as well as emergency control over the necessary civic bodies and municipal fire and police departments. Training and exercise required to teach the highest possible proficiency in these new missions must be intense and continuing, even at the sacrifice of training for land combat of the historic type. Units must possess the highest possible degree of mobility in order to be able to reach any point within their assigned area in a matter of an hour at most. But most vital is that all elements must have complete and detailed plans of exactly what they must do to restore the damaged area to the fullest possible effectiveness in the shortest time and with the minimum interruption to the operations that caused it to be chosen as a target. Only with this protection and assurance of the maximum possible assistance will it be possible to limit the spread of a panic and prevent the hysterical flight that might well make the first attack so successful that no other would be required. We cannot afford in this age to wait for the catalytic effect of a thermonuclear Pearl Harbor to weld together an effective defense force for the home front, even if such an organization were able to cope with the problems of these weapons. Only a well-organized, disciplined, and equipped force that can be moved into the area can overcome the dazed shock which is bound to follow this attack. This is truly the problem of the United States *national* defense.


The assignment of the mission of protection, rescue and relief of our civil population and of our industrial and political facilities as the principal duty of our army follows the pattern of the missions of today's air and sea forces. This does not leave us less able to protect ourselves and to meet our commitments against the contingency of a more conventional conflict. The troops organized and trained for this mission might not be as well prepared to take the field of battle as if they had devoted all their time to preparation for conventional warfare, but they will be disciplined and physically fit, as indeed they must be, for this assignment. The specialists in communications, engineering, transportation, medical service, and all the other functions which are so necessary in war, will be needed under both types of operations. Their equipment will be functioning and ready and the troop units will be organized. If the war follows the more merciful pattern of past wars, these units can be taught the more lethal aspects of their trade while the military situation is clarifying and while the shipping required to move them to the area of the conflict is being made ready. Similarly, if we are able to live through the nightmare of this first assault and if the enemy's power to attack the home front can be reduced, these troops can then be regrouped into normal army units possessing the benefit of a combat seasoning they would not otherwise get.

THIS change in the mission of the Army will be a bitter pill for us soldiers. We are a proud clan, and the traditions of 180 years are not easily abandoned. The Army does not relish the picture of surrendering the field of battle to supersonic aircraft and super-destructive weapons. Defense against this type of enemy seems a job for those who cannot fight—a nursemaid's job. A man's job is to pick up his weapon and come to grips with the enemy. We still teach that the man on the ground is the man who wins the wars, and we are emotionally unable to admit that our own technicians and workers are somehow really in the war. To say that what the Army needs most is plenty of truck drivers and engineers and doctors is strange indeed. But our tradition—and our oaths of allegiance—require us to defend and protect the people of the country from all enemies foreign and domestic. If the enemy has become an inanimate monster loosed from beyond our reach, our duty is to protect the people from total destruction by panic or by sheer immobility.

We must not allow traditionalism, complacency, or wishful thinking to blind us to the awful truth of the problem we face. Certainly we all hope and pray that our goverment will be able to prevent this disaster from happening. We cannot know the final answers to our problems. All we can do is our best for the humanity in which we believe and keep our faith in God, who has so far kept us from the ultimate folly of self-destruction.

IRONS IN THE FIRE

All-Aluminum Truck



This experimental, all-aluminum 2½-ton truck has been developed for the Army by Chrysler Corp. Although it carries the same load as the conventional 2½-ton truck, it weighs only 9,000 pounds and would be especially useful in airborne operations. Known as the T55, the truck is not scheduled for quantity production, but it has already influenced the design of vehicles slated for mass production.

Among the features of the T55 are a fuel injection system (instead of a carburetor), hydraulic disc brakes, automatic gear shift, and ball joint suspension. It has a six-cylinder, 200-horsepower, air-cooled engine, capable of producing speeds up to 60 miles an hour. It can ford deep-water streams and can climb a 60% grade.

Electrically Controlled Camera


An aircraft reconnaissance camera has been disclosed that uses an electric clutch to actuate the shutter. The camera, developed by the Hycon Manufacturing Co. and the Warner Electric Brake & Clutch Co., is designed to take clear and detailed night aerial photos from jet aircraft. Powerful flash bombs, dropped just before the photo "run," light up the target.

Improved Non-Military Plane



Cessna Aircraft Company has unveiled its new 1955 model 180. The plane's O-470-J Continental engine is operated with an inch less manifold and 100 less r.p.m. than the previous model. These changes give the aircraft a cruising speed of 150 miles an hour, though noise has been reduced considerably. The one-piece landing gear has been re-angled so that tire-to-ground contact is three inches farther forward than in previous models. This change increases ease in landing and safety in taxiing.

Air-Drop Device



The Office of Naval Research and the Kaman Aircraft Corp. have developed a device, known as a Rotochute, for air-dropping supplies from lower altitudes than is possible with a parachute. It consists of two rotor blades attached to a hub, which in turn is connected to a standard M2 supply container. The blades fold back 90 degrees and telescope to half their normal length, permitting the device to be carried on the external bomb rack of jet aircraft. The container is released as a bomb would be. As soon as it is free of the aircraft, the rotor blades begin spinning automatically. The container comes to earth at approximately the same rate of descent as an autorotation landing of a helicopter.

The Rotochute is shown above with its blades in the retracted position, together with two small-scale models that were used in test drops. Because of the small area of its rotor blades and the low altitude from which it is dropped, the Rotochute is much less susceptible to wind drift than a parachute, and "pinpoint" landings in a small area are possible.

UNUSUAL circumstances surrounded the battle for Pork Chop. Truce talks were reaching a final stage, and the Korean armistice was actually signed less than three weeks after the hill was finally abandoned to the Chinese Communists. It is for this reason that errors were made in violation of sound field-manual doctrine. The best terrain was not always occupied and organized; fortifications and trench systems grew up fortuitously rather than by design; training and orientation were sometimes overlooked because they did not seem important in a war that might end tomorrow at the conference table.

But there were other errors that might occur again in any war, total or limited:

- Much of our counterfire against enemy mortars and artillery was ineffective. The enemy was well dug in, and zone and sweeping fire was inaccurate and had little effect. Fewer rounds, fired with more accuracy at known concentrations, would have been more effective. The results of scatter fire did not justify the high expenditures of ammunition.
- So long as we kept counterattacking the objective that the enemy had selected, we met his fire power head-on. Only if we had forced him to shift it by threatening one of his positions could we have reduced the incoming rounds on Pork Chop and its approaches. An attack on Baldy for this purpose was considered, but it was rejected largely because of the imminence of the armistice.
- Our field manuals call for advancing infantry to rush through incoming artillery fire when making an assault. This is correct when the attack is made on a broad front, when enemy fire has been dispersed by having to meet several threats simultaneously, and when effective counterfire has reduced the volume of enemy fire. These conditions were never fulfilled at Pork Chop. It is significant that the most successful U.S. counterattack was made when armored personnel carriers were used to bring the assault troops to a line of departure close to the objective. Whether facing tactical atomic weapons or concentrated artillery fire, troops must be kept out of the open as long as possible before the actual moment of the assault.
- Consumption of all kinds of supply items was on a scale that may be impossible to duplicate in the future. Supply was adequate, but distribution was poor because water, rations, and ammunition had to be carried through heavy enemy fire. There were too few medics for the number of casualties. The evacuation rate became adequate when personnel carriers were sent out on a planned schedule instead of on call. Most of the supply resources of the 7th Division were concentrated on backstopping a battle for one outpost. If another action had been taking place at the same time, the supply facilities would have felt the strain. Troops who take for granted the supply bonanza of Korea will have to adjust their demands if we are ever called upon to fight a general war.

But criticism that comes from hindsight is notoriously easy to make. The reader will no doubt have his own opinion and find his own "lessons" after he has read the story of the battle for Pork Chop.

PORK CHOP

Battle for a Korean Outpost

COLONEL WILLIAM R. KINTNER


THIS story could have begun in 1951 or 1952. It could have been Elko or Vegas, Charley or Harry, Christmas or any one of the oddly named and fiercely contested outposts which marked the bloodiest spots along the Korean battle line. But it happened to be Pork Chop. Let's turn back to July 1953.

For a hill to qualify as a Korean outpost it had to be smack out in front of the main battle line. Pork Chop qualified. The Chinese were dug in on three sides and were keeping a head count on everyone coming in and out. From Old Baldy they could observe every shovel of dirt tossed out of the trenches and watch us hammer in every cross beam on the overhead cover we were building.

At times it didn't make sense. These outposts marked that last eddy of the UN 1951 offensive. Here the forward troops dug in when the Commies asked for a truce. They were never designed for last-ditch stands. An outpost, in military jargon, is set up "to delay, deceive and disorganize" an attacking enemy, not to be held at all costs.

But Korean outposts were held. The longer the truce talks dragged on, the more the diplomatic value of Vegas, Arsenal, and Pork Chop began to outweigh their military worth. And when the Chinese were pounding away at you, the diplomatic factor in the selection of military positions didn't make a pleasant topic.

During the last six months of the war, the Chinese made a play for our big-name outposts. Pork Chop was hit hard, and each time, in December 1952 and March and April 1953, it held. It was a kind of thorn in the pride of the



The area of the battle. The supply road leading to Pork Chop is shown by the dotted line

Chinese. They really wanted that hill.

Pork Chop was 7th Division property. It was part of a speculative real-estate development which included Old Baldy on the left and Arsenal, on the southern tip of T-Bone, on the right. When the Chinese took Old Baldy in March 1953, Pork Chop didn't have much of a future. Old Baldy now dominated it, and the access road from the left and Hasakkol and Pokkae to the front and right almost completed the circle. Baldy's loss required major adjustments in the center of the 7th Division's main line of resistance. In April, while these were being made, the Communists socked Pork Chop again. They almost got it. Two battalion counterattacks finally cleaned out the enemy from the position.

"THE Chop" was a shambles when the April battle was over. Trenches and bunkers were almost nonexistent and had to be rebuilt.

Major General Arthur G. Trudeau, 7th Division commander, decided to rebuild Pork Chop—to make it impregnable if that were possible. The big task of reconstruction fell to the 17th Infantry. The Chinese opposed the idea, to begin with. They had observation and the place was ringed with mortars. Day after day more enemy artillery and mortar rounds fell on the few acres of Pork Chop than on the rest of the division.

It took a lot of manpower to rebuild Pork Chop. There was always a company on the hill. This company was so preoccupied with staying alive, keeping its weapons in shape, and defending The Chop at night, that it could contribute little to the rebuilding. Because of the strain, companies were rotated frequently. Lumber, ammo, rations, and water rode out to The Chop on an armored personnel carrier. With full alert all night and the clatter of building during the day, sleep was hard to come by.

One night in May the Chinese made a reconnaissance in force on our defensive setup. They hit every outguard before dropping in hundreds of rounds of artillery, and they then probed the eastern finger of The Chop. Our follow-up screening patrol policed the area in daylight under cover of smoke, and accidentally stumbled upon a Chinese assault position between Pork Chop and Hasakkol; we dubbed it "The Rat's Nest." This was a tip-off that Pork Chop was on the list. We tried to drive them out. We used 155mm and 8-inch guns, air missions and a company sweep to no avail. Everything pointed to a Chinese attack. The only thing we didn't know was when.

It came less than two hours before midnight on 6 July, seventy-eight days after the April battle. The thunder of artillery fire hit all along the division front at once. Simultaneous reports came into the 17th Infantry's regimental operations bunker. Heavy artillery barrages hit the 1st Battalion on Pork Chop and the 3d Battalion on Erie and Arsenal.

The initial attack broke through every effort to stop it. The forward bunkers and trenches had been personally checked by the platoon leaders between the time the shelling began and the enemy hit the positions. The platoons were ready. The Chinese hit in force with carefully prepared assault teams. Each team had a definite objective and used bazookas, satchel charges, and flame throwers. Some of them used yellow sulphur sticks to make fumes which forced the men out of their bunkers.

Wounded survivors told of nine distinct company attacks during the first night. Wave after wave dashed against the positions. It was a saturation attack. An attack in such force soon divided



A Korean hill. Note the network of trenches and bunkers

and isolated the defenders, who could not support or reinforce one another. Communications within the positions were soon gone. A single bunker might contain two or three men who had to resist ten times that many.

A succession of companies and battalions fought to keep The Chop. The first was Company A, 17th Infantry. By 2256 hours, 6 July, Company A was receiving automatic-weapons fire on the armored personnel carrier landing which was adjacent to the main trench leading into the position. At 2300, Company A reported that the enemy was coming into the trenches and that the left sector of Pork Chop was partly occupied by the enemy. The CO called for reinforcements. The Chinese were around and on top of his CP.

During the month before the attack the battalion occupying the Pork Chop sector maintained, on division order, a ready reserve company in defilade behind Hill 200. The 17th's Company B was ready, and it was ordered to move out to The Chop. Its close-by reserve location made reinforcement in time possible.

Shortly after midnight, Company B reached Pork Chop, made contact with Company A, and swept over the positions on the hill. The company retook at least nine bunkers in the left sector and cleared part of the central sector near Company A's CP. Some time later, Company A reported that the enemy had overrun Pork Chop, withdrawn slightly, and then attacked again, but that the right sector was being held. Bugles were heard intermittently, heralding successive attacks. At 0235, Company A reported enemy in trenches at its CP, the trench blocked, and Chinese placing small-arms fire down trench. Sixteen minutes later, Company A requested additional reinforcements. At 0347, Company A requested reinforcements to man bunkers that had been cleared of enemy.

Shortly after the attack began, the 2d Battalion, 32d Infantry, was attached to the 17th with a division string attached. The picture on The Chop was far from clear. No one wanted to send a third company out to such a small, crowded position.

Mounting evidence indicated that this was no hit-and-run attack. Incoming artillery continued heavy, and for the first time in months was hitting rear installations as well as the MLR. General Trudeau cut the string to his reserve battalion.

JUST before dawn on 7 July, Company E, 32d Infantry, was placed under the operational control of the 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry, and was sent out to reinforce Company A on Pork Chop. Lieutenant Colonel "Rocky" Read, CO of the 1st Battalion, went out to Pork Chop with a platoon from this company at daybreak. Elements of three companies were now on the hill. The remainder of Company E was sent to the outpost on APCs during the day.

The situation was chaotic. Some bunkers had been taken back, but there were not enough men available to keep advancing, as infantrymen had to hold bunkers as they were taken. Dead and wounded cluttered up the trenches and made traffic through them difficult.

Hand-to-hand fighting for the trenches and bunkers of the outpost continued throughout the day. Friendly and enemy forces continued to reinforce. Sporadic but well-placed enemy small-arms, artillery, and mortar fire came in constantly. Our forces used APCs to evacuate and resupply. Without them reinforcement would have been almost impossible, since the only road to Pork Chop was being systematically interdicted.

At about noon, General Trudeau and Colonel Harris, regimental commander, went to The Chop to see the situation at first hand. As a result of an on-the-ground appraisal, General Trudeau was convinced the outpost could be retaken.

Friendly and hostile groups were mixed together. Positions frequently changed hands. During the day the Chinese were reinforcing in groups of from five to ten men, gradually building up their strength on the outpost. About dusk, a company-size group of them was seen from an outpost located on Hill 200, coming on Pork Chop to the right and rear of the outpost. Fire from artillery and 81mm mortars was placed on this group.

The stage was set for the night's counterattack. In view of enemy observation and artillery concentrations, a daylight counterattack appeared to be impractical. The Chinese occupied the bunkers on the highest ground of Pork Chop. Should the counterattack mission be to seize and hold these bunkers or to sweep the Chinese off the hill?

THE decision was made for a night sweep. Company F, 32d Infantry, had a few hours to prepare for the mission. Plans were made to exploit a possible surprise and to support the attack with the troops on the hill. The plan adopted by Company F was to march down the forward slope of Hill 347, across the swirling stream in the valley, up Brinson Finger, and then to sweep The Chop from west to east. A nighttime single-file march through barbed wire in totally unfamiliar terrain, across a swampy valley and a stream swollen by heavy rains, was a difficult assignment. But in addition, the company had to climb the precipitous slope of Brinson Finger, make a right-angle turn to the right, and regroup for attack. At 2023 hours, Company F departed from Hill 347 for enemy positions on Pork Chop.

AT 2115 hours, Colonel Read reported a fire fight in progress in friendly trenches and on the personnel-carrier landing on Pork Chop. Heavy incoming mortar and artillery fire was reported. Meanwhile, Company F was

working its tortuous way toward contact. It covered the one or two miles to the objective in almost five hours, reaching the enemy bunkers undetected.

At 0135 hours, 8 July, Company F found itself in the western trenches almost unopposed. It had surprised the enemy. The Chinese immediately called for increased artillery and mortar fire and more reinforcements.

At 0135 hours, Company F was ordered to stop the sweep and to seize the high ground on Pork Chop. It gained some trenches but eventually ran out of grenades and ammunition. At 0425 hours, Company F reported that the enemy had it surrounded. Remnants of the company were able to withdraw down the south side of Pork Chop, where the wounded were evacuated by APCs, and the remainder of the company withdrew through the valley between Hill 347 and Pork Chop. During the action that night the enemy threw an additional battalion into the engagement for Pork Chop.

Although Company F's attack was not successful, it did break up a strong Chinese assault on Pork Chop landing that reached its peak just about the time Company F made contact. If the Chinese had taken the landing, the outpost would have been lost.


The troops on the position were running low on ammunition of all types. Small-arms ammunition was dispatched by personnel carrier. Friendly casualties were evacuated by personnel carrier. Heavy enemy artillery continued to fall on the outpost and on and behind the MLR. Seesaw action continued for the rest of the night with sporadic small-arms and automatic-weapons fire fights.

WHEN dawn broke, the situation remained much the same. Both sides had reinforced but neither had succeeded in capturing many of the bunkers occupied by the other. Shortly after daybreak, the 2d Battalion, 32d Infantry, assumed responsibility for the sector.

Plans were made to relieve the remnants of the 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry. During the day, Companies A and B, less one platoon, were relieved. Because of its location, the 2d Platoon of Company A could not be relieved and remained on outpost. The rest of the 1st Battalion, 17th, except for its weapons company, was returned to regimental rear for rehabilitation. This battalion, the first involved in the action, was to be recommitted before the battle was over.

When it became apparent that the night attack had failed and that the troops on position were unable to make any real progress toward clearing Pork Chop of the enemy, other measures were considered. At a conference at the 17th Infantry CP at 0800 hours, 8 July, General Taylor, Eighth Army commander; Lieutenant General Clarke, I Corps commander; Major General Trudeau, 7th Division commander; Colonel Harris, CO, 17th Infantry; and Major John Noble, CO, 2d Battalion, 17th Infantry, whose battalion was to make the next counterattack, completely reviewed the situation. The decision was made to launch a two-company daylight attack in the middle of the afternoon. The attack was to be preceded by twenty minutes of preparatory time fire on position, with surrounding enemy OPs to be smoked and enemy mortar and artillery positions neutralized. Troops were to be moved by truck to the forward checkpoint. Company G was to attack the east side of Pork Chop and secure high ground, jumping from a line of departure on the forward slopes of Hill 200. Company E was to follow the stream bed on the reverse slope of Hill 200, attack up the western side of Pork Chop, and tie in with Company G on the high ground. Special instructions were issued to the troops to stay out of the trenches until they were on their objective.

The attack, begun at 1540 hours, encountered a holocaust of enemy fire.





7th Division troops and Korean laborers move up a hillside road

Both companies pressed home their attacks vigorously until their leaders were decimated. The momentum of their attack carried forward elements of both companies almost the whole way to their objectives. By 1800 the rain of artillery and mortar fire and the Chinese small-arms fire from the bunkers stopped them.

The weather, which had plagued us from the beginning, remained overcast. Our air was socked in. Counterbattery had not located all the new gun positions the Chinese had set up to support their attack. Actually, it couldn't. You can't silence hundreds of mortars and artillery pieces that are firing at a well-known piece of ground on which they have registered for days. The only solution is what the manual says—a diversionary attack to split the fire. Few troops have ever attacked through such concentrated fire. The elimination of hostile fire power is indispensable to any successful attack against strongly held positions.

The failure of the attack had been a near-miss and no one was calling it quits. At the morning command conference, a tentative decision had been made to relieve the 17th's 3d Battalion on the regiment's right section. In the event the 2d Battalion attack failed, the 3d was to make a pre-dawn attack the next day. This battalion was holding the equally vulnerable Erie-Arsenal outpost on the tip of T-Bone. To use the 3d Battalion on The Chop required that two of its companies be pulled off the line. It was too risky to relieve Company L on exposed and often-hit Arsenal in the midst of a battle on the neighboring outpost.

Participation in the Pork Chop action by the 3d Battalion began with the relief of Company I by the 1st Provisional Company, 17th Infantry. The relief was completed by 1730 hours, 8 July. At 1805 hours, Company K was ordered to move to an assembly area near the Pork Chop checkpoint. Major Costigan, CO of the 3d Battalion, reported to Colonel Harris at 1820 hours and was briefed on the situation. At 2230 hours, Major Costigan was ordered to prepare to counterattack Pork Chop with two companies, which were to arrive on position at first light.

It was planned to send both companies across the cut to the right of Hill 200, then west along the base of Hill 200 to Pork Chop. This route was selected to avoid the intense enemy artillery and mortar concentrations known to be in the valley south of Pork Chop.

Because of the late arrival of Company I, it was decided to start Company K out first so as to insure having darkness to cover the movement to Pork Chop. It left the attack position at 0300, crossing the LD at 0315.

Before Company K had cleared the attack position, Company I arrived and crossed the LD behind Company K. The two companies moved along the route and assaulted the enemy-held positions in their zone of advance at 0415 hours. As soon as the assault was detected, intense mortar and artillery concentrations fell on the attacking elements and inflicted heavy casualties on both units. The fighting soon became a series of small, isolated actions of a few men against one or two bunkers. Officer casualties were high. By 0900, Company I had one officer left and Company K had none. The momentum


Infantrymen in Korea take cover as a Communist mortar round lands nearby




of the attack was lost when the men were finally hit hard by the heavy shelling.

This attack also fell into the might-have-happened category. Little time was available for briefing and preparation. Because of the resulting inadequate troop orientation, the attack failed to capitalize on its biggest asset—surprise. With daylight breaking, the troops were caught out in the open under murderous hostile fire. Control of the elements of these two companies passed to Major Noble on The Chop who now had under his wing Company E, 32d Infantry, and elements of Companies E, F, G, H, I and K of the 17th.

DAYBREAK brought the sun, and sweltering heat. Water became a precious commodity. Air attacks on enemy reinforcing and resupply routes and the exhaustion of continuous conflict made it possible that the Chinese might give up first. On this chance another attack was planned. A concerted attack from the eastern finger to the bunkers on the crest of the hill might tip the scale. In the hope that it would, the decision was made to move Company C, 17th Infantry, out to The Chop on personnel carriers to deploy for attack from trenches on the eastern finger. Company C had been on Hill 200 since the beginning of the battle and had to be relieved. Several reliefs were put into effect to make this possible. The Chinese stepped up their artillery while the shift was made. Casualties sustained here plus exhaustion from three days of living under constant barrage and terrific heat reduced the combat effectiveness of the company. Nevertheless, after reaching Pork Chop and its line of departure, Company C made substantial gains. It cleared most of the right finger before darkness fell. This was the most successful counterattack yet.





The situation on Pork Chop on the night of 9-10 July was not according to the book. There were remnants of Companies E, F, G, H, I, and K of the 17th, and Company E of the 32d, all under command of Major Noble. With almost no staff, poor or nonexistent communications, with Chinese bunkers intermixed with friendly, control became extraordinarily difficult. Besides, many of the men had been there for several days, surrounded by dead and wounded whom it had been impossible to evacuate.

Plans were made to effect relief of all elements and complete evacuation of dead and wounded during 10 July. Both the relief and evacuation would be completed by personnel carriers. The 3d Battalion, 32d Infantry, was to make the relief, and to prepare The Chop for a full counterattack by the 1st Battalion, 32d, on 11 July, supported by a diversionary battalion attack on Old Baldy, next door, if army approved.


These plans were knocked out. At midnight, at the same time as the arrival of Company I, 32d Infantry, behind Hill 200, the Chinese launched a series of attacks on Pork Chop which continued until dawn. Simultaneously, the MLR and the roads to the battalion CP were shelled. Plans to effect the relief were suspended until the situation on The Chop clarified. Many FOs on The Chop were no longer teamed up with their infantry commander. FOs with higher-powered radios were able to get "the word" to the rear better than the infantry. Piecing together a comprehensible picture received from so many, and often so conflicting, reports was almost impossible.

Company I, which had been assembled to effect relief, was dispatched just before dawn in armored personnel carriers with instructions to reinforce the threatened right sector. But upon their arrival the threat disappeared. The relief was resumed, Company K, 32d Infantry, taking over the left half of the hill and Company I the right. All day long the APCs, under constant fire, moved men out and brought weary soldiers back. By 1800, Companies I and K of the 32d were the only friendly forces on Pork Chop.

THE night of 10-11 July, the Chinese hit again. Lieutenant Colonel Taylor, in command of the 32d's 3d Battalion, took over on The Chop. Some additional bunkers were lost, but at daylight we still retained substantial positions on the outpost.

By Saturday the battle had been raging for five days. Five battalions had been thrown into the struggle to regain complete control of a one company-sized outpost. By then it was known that the Chinese had thrown an entire division into this battle.

Another command conference was held at the 7th Division CP. The Eighth Army commander reluctantly announced his decision to withdraw. The closeness of the armistice and other factors unknown to the men who had put their hearts into this bitter battle lay behind that heart-breaking decision. To give up voluntarily what so many had sacrificed their lives to retain was a hard order to execute.



A daylight withdrawal by personnel carrier was planned and executed. Colonel Read skillfully coordinated this pull-back. A carefully devised supporting fire plan kept enemy interference to a minimum. By the end of the afternoon, most of the troops, including the wounded men, had been withdrawn. Engineers went out to plant demolitions. By sundown The Chop was abandoned and its systematic pulverization by artillery fire and air strikes began.

CEREBRATIONS

This department is designed to accommodate the short, pithy and good humored expression of ideas—radical and reactionary, new and old. We pay for all contributions published but you deserve to be put on notice that the rate of payment depends upon the originality of the subject and the quality of writing rather than length. This department is hungry for contributions, so shoot that good idea in . . . today.

The Campaign Hat

THERE'S a lot of talk about returning to the old traditions. The salute has been reinstated. New uniforms are in the offing. The prestige of the NCO is on the upgrade.

There is nothing more important to *esprit* than a soldier's headgear. Headgear is as vital to the soldier as the beacon on a lighthouse or the meringue on a lemon pie. But today's most prevalent covering for the military head, the overseas cap, is no more likely to foster tradition or *esprit* than a lefthanded salute.

This wobbly cloth canoe is as practical an adornment on a soldier as mammary glands on a boar. Can you imagine this ungainly cross between a bellhop's pillbox and a wayward napkin perched on MacArthur's heroic head? Why did Generals Van Fleet and Ridgway and Taylor disdain it in Korea? It's taboo around the Pentagon. Why prescribe it for the field? That cloth caricature of a headpiece was probably why old Vinegar Joe Stilwell was so devoted to the old campaign hat. Now *there's* a hat!

Let us consider what a hat should have. What is its purpose? First, it should protect its wearer from the elements—wind and rain and sun. No wind could ever blow off the campaign hat, with its chin strap. No rain could penetrate it. No sun came down that it didn't offer shade.

But what of the present cloth contraption? A mild zephyr will send it sailing. A dew will saturate it. And your face will boil and blister in the sun while it idly slithers in your sweat, catches dirt, and causes aggravation.

Then consider the constant balancing act it requires. The book says to keep it cornered over your eye. But nod and it slips down over your eyes. Shake your head and it spins around and looks like what Napoleon wore at Waterloo. Tuck it into your belt and it wrinkles as irretrievably as a paper towel.

If there is anything that a uniform should have, it's uniformity. But the sizes, shapes, and mutations of the overseas cap are about as standard as the stuff that a pitcher like Yankee Ed Lopat tosses across the plate. Overseas caps vary from the sliver-like Hiawatha's canoe that covers about a sixteenth of the pate, to the stately galleon which is held up by the ears.

Then there is your hair. Take off a campaign hat and your hair remains as neat as the drill field at West Point. But take off an overseas cap and the top of your head looks like Hurricane Hazel had passed through. And if you have little or no hair, you ought to insert some little suction cups on the sweat band to prevent slippage.

Then there is the problem of ventilation. The old campaign hat had holes that allowed some healthy circulation. Even the peaked service hat provides means for oxygen to get in. But the overseas cap serves as a hermetic seal.

It is a mystery why the old campaign hat was discarded. Everyone who ever wore it speaks of it with so much moist-eyed affection that one would think they were speaking of Mother, home, or the chicken farm they're going to have when they retire. But though it served all the necessary purposes of a hat, it was replaced by a purposeless piece of limp cloth.

There is much talk about bringing back the Army saber. But a saber has as much utility to the modern soldier as a bow and arrow. Let's start a campaign for the campaign hat. Why not poll the American soldier on whether he'd like the old hat back? It would be an opportunity literally to crown him with a fine old tradition.

MAJOR JOHN E. MURRAY

Amphibious Trailers

AFTER reading THE JOURNAL'S exploration of the problem of over-the-beach logistics ["Ship to Shore," November], it occurred to me that maybe in the search for new equipment a time-tested principle is being overlooked—the use of trailers.

Because the application of power to water-borne craft and land vehicles differs so greatly, any combination is bound to emphasize the worst features of both. For example, the DUKW, while useful, isn't much of a truck or much of a boat. But it is expensive.

Why not get a good boat and a good wheeled prime mover, and let them cooperate in moving amphibious trailers. They could move more tonnage per dollar than any of the devices that have been proposed.

The trailers, when on the water side of a beach, would be clamped together in two rows to form a single large barge of up to 12 units. If cargo nets were

used, 12 swings of a ship's boom could load the group. A fast tug could push them ashore, an automatic uncoupling device could then free them and tractors could pull them from the water and on to the depot area where cranes could lift out the still-loaded cargo net.

The trailers would have the following specifications: a capacity of 10 tons; short-based tracks mounted inside the wheels 4 to 6 inches off the ground; sufficient freeboard when afloat to allow operation in rough surf; rugged simple construction to allow cheap mass production; simple coupling procedure, including a hand-operated winch. One pair of trailers in each train of 12 would have sloping front ends.

On exceptionally steep beaches, auxiliary power from winches on the prime movers, or even a chain installed on the beach with a separate engine, could be made available.

This system would have several advantages: the units would be easily transportable by sea; maintenance costs would be low; only a small amount of new equipment would have to be tested; there would be no amphibious power plants, which would be made idle by lack of over-the-beach operations; relatively few men would be needed; operations ashore would be flexible; and damage to a portion of the train would not tie up the entire unit.

CAPT. WILLIAM E. MCKENZIE

High Standards and Morale

THERE has been widespread complaint that the new Uniform Code of Military Justice has been largely responsible for lowered morale among career officers and NCOs because it has seriously undercut discipline.

This is not so.

I have compared the new UCMJ and the 1951 manual for courts-martial with the old Articles of War and the 1928 manual and I am convinced that there has been no substantial change which—below the divisional level—limits the rights, authority, or prerogatives of a commander beyond those which formerly existed. There are actually only three important changes that affect the unit commander and his men.

First, noncommissioned officers can sit on a court if an enlisted defendant desires them. In my opinion, this is an excellent change. In fact, it might well be made mandatory. Too many impressionable young lieutenants can be swayed by the oratory of trial and defense counsels. Now that these gentlemen are usually trained lawyers, this danger is even greater. But oratory means little or nothing to an experienced NCO who fully understands the stern requirements of discipline, as well as the problems of the enlisted man.

Secondly, there is the Bad Conduct Discharge—introduced by the Army even before the adoption of UCMJ. But this has not limited the authority of commanders. It gives the officer with Special Court-Martial jurisdiction a power which he did not previously possess, a power formerly held only by the commander with General Court-Martial jurisdiction.

Finally, there is unit—company or battery—punishment. This used to be administered under the authority of Article 104, and now comes under Article 15 of UCMJ. But the authority of the commander has not been decreased, nor has the possible punishment been decreased. On the contrary, the maximum period of punishment has been increased from one week to two.

But many fine officers and NCOs *know* that the authority of the commander has been limited in recent years. They *know* that supervision from above has taken the "justice" out of Military Justice and has substituted picayune legal details.

They are right. Yet this is due to other, somewhat more elusive causes than UCMJ itself.

We know that an officer or NCO today lacks the command authority and prerogatives that were enjoyed by men of comparable rank in "the old Army." And he often has a well-founded suspicion that he lacks the professional competence of his "old Army" predecessors.

The reasons for this are discernible. There is a climate of distrust of the military commander which partly stems from the fact that discipline and command authority are anathema to many Americans. It is also a reflection of a growing tendency toward military bureaucracy and over-administration. In addition, the Army often limits the authority of commanders because many officers are less well qualified for command than in the past.

This lowering of professional competence in the Army is alarming. There are many fine, dedicated officers, but they are a minority. Only a small percentage of Army officers read such professional service periodicals as THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL. Most officers and NCOs do little serious studying beyond the absolute minimum necessary to get by in their daily duties. Although to some extent this may be a reflection of a society built around movies, TV, and the worship of idle leisure, it is also attributable to inadequate measures by the Army to assure maximum efficiency and high professional attainments.

No Army officer, for instance, is required to prove his professional qualifications for promotion. There is no procedure for gauging accurately the effectiveness of a commander in performing his duties. Promotion through the grade of lieutenant colonel is in practice automatic for an officer who performs minimum duties in a mediocre manner and who has avoided serious trouble.

In our system of efficiency reports, each officer's performance of duty is rated by his immediate superior. Every effort is made to inspire the superior to rate his subordinate impartially, but the efficiency report can only be an individual assessment of a fellow man. Prejudices and personality clashes inevitably creep in, as well as sympathy for "good old John," who hasn't killed any of his men—yet. Meanwhile, the young officer with gumption and initiative can be hurt by one or two unfavorable reports from excessively conservative or unimaginative commanders.

It seems incredible that there is no longer a system of examinations whereby, before promotion, an officer has to prove his technical competence for the duties of the higher grade. Such examinations would force every officer to study his profession. The incompetent would eliminate themselves, while good officers would become better.

Almost equally incredible is the lack of a set of standards by which the achievements of a commander can be measured and compared with those of other officers of comparable grade and experience. The Army has always prided itself on "results." The Army's inspections and combat-readiness tests lend themselves readily as bases for forming standards for measuring these results.

COL. T. N. DUPUY

Reenlistment Blues

THE Pentagon has come up with various plans to increase *esprit* and enlistments at the same time. One of these ideas, to set up a new system of computing reenlistment bonuses, was made into law by the Reenlistment Bonus Act of 16 July 1954. Another, to change the uniform from olive drab to a more colorful and attractive color and design that could compete with the smart-looking Air Force, Navy, and Marine jobs, was also adopted after the inevitable hassling that accompanies any change in the *status quo*, and word about the new greens was sent out to the troops.

Along with the change in the uniform came a resurgence of Army blues. The GIs wanted a special off-duty uniform, something snappy, something sharp, something to wear on those very extra-special occasions. They've always *nearly* had such a uniform, but somehow just never got around to buying it. Some enterprising units, however, have recently encouraged wearing blues by awarding them to outstanding men for exemplary service. For example, Second Army gives a set of blues, along with other awards, to its Soldier of the Month. This particular program receives widespread publicity, and competition is spirited. The troops really perk up when they see a man in blues stepping out through the area. Yet the blues are still rarely seen where enlisted men gather, and the biggest reason seems to be the cost. When you're buying shoes for the kids, it's pretty hard to shell out $90 for another uniform. This is a problem that must be solved if the dress uniform is ever to be more than a rarely seen curiosity.

When a first-three-grader or a corporal with seven years' service reenlists, give him, in addition to his regular bonus, a set of blues on a one-time-issue basis. Give the Regular a uniform to match his pride in his profession. This won't cost the Government an exorbitant amount, and it will give NCOs a formal uniform befitting their station and rank. By making it a one-time deal, the Government will keep the expense to a minimum. By limiting the award to NCOs, the Government not only saves money but also helps the reenlistment program by encouraging continued service of Regular NCOs. Of course, some system must be worked out to accommodate our NCOs on indefinite tours, especially since many of our senior men are in this category. But once the idea is sold, the details of its administration can easily be worked out.

Some may complain that this proposal discriminates against the young recruit who enlists, the man who is drafted, or the reservist or Guardsman who comes in with rank. Not so. Each man has the same opportunity to work for the required grade and, having attained it, to reenlist and win his blues. Far from being a discriminating barrier, the awarding of blues will be an added incentive to old soldiers to stay in service, and for younger ones to strive for a higher goal.

CAPT. JOHN R. BYERS

The Officers' Mess

RECENT efforts to restore discipline, tradition, and privileges are very gratifying, but one important foundation of morale has been overlooked. I mean the officers' mess. I am not referring to officers' clubs, which have for some obscure reason been renamed "open messes," but to government-ration messes that are restricted to officers.

There has been a drive to abolish these messes, apparently for the sake of economy. At some posts managers of the open messes, well aware that nobody with a monopoly on food has ever gone broke, have supported this drive. I am just as cost-conscious as the next fellow, but there are limits to economy. We could certainly save a lot more money by ladling out food with an entrenching tool and letting officers eat out of their helmets. No army is going to show a dollars-and-cents profit, and the small operating expense involved in the maintenance of officers' messes is well justified, especially in view of the tremendous sums spent on "morale" activities with results that are at best debatable.

The officers' mess is the one place where the officers of an organization may assemble in an atmosphere of fellowship and unit solidarity. It offers an opportunity to get to know one's fellow officers away from the mask of official business, and to benefit professionally from relaxed discussion. An officers' mess is almost indispensable for the establishment and perpetuation of any long-range regimental tradition. A good mess will check the current trend toward an "eight-to-five-just-another-job" Army. Dinner, which I still maintain is served at noon, allows the married man to meet the almost extinct bachelor. The latter is furnished decent dining facilities and is rescued from a deadly diet of assembly-line hamburgers and wax-flavored coffee.

The splendid regimental messes of the British Army stand as an excellent example of what may be accomplished. I recommend we attempt to secure the same.

CAPTAIN REACTIONARY

Automatic Artillery

EVEN the most active imagination is staggered by the pace at which military equipment is being made automatic. For the artillery, the future promises gadgets that absorb all elements of firing data, including weather effects and rotation of the earth, and provide automatic solutions. Let's liberate our imaginations and see what devices we may be using in the not-too-distant future.

Imagine a super gadget that can be placed on a hill overlooking the target area. It will be built around a lightweight radar set, which will accurately measure the azimuth, distance, and height (relative to its own position) of the target. An altimeter and a data transmission system similar to that presently used by the antiaircraft will transmit data directly to a master electronic computer located at the gun position.

The guns will be equipped with automatic loaders, rammers, and fuze setters. A nearby metro station, serving either a battery or a battalion, will automatically compute corrections for weather, incorporate corrections for the earth's rotation when necessary, and transmit the corrections directly to the master computer.

All these elements will be connected by data transmission cables, buried underground or armored with a tough, flexible, lightweight armor so that shellfire or tanks will not damage them. All batteries of the battalion will be connected by the same cable, so that all can be fired on one target. And the whole system will be powered by portable generators.

In a typical mission, an operator or observer at the OP sees a target or picks one up on the radar. He "locks" the radar on the target and pushes a button to start transmission of data electrically to the computer at the gun position, and to load and fire the guns. A choice of buttons allows the observer to select the proper fuze for each volley. If he wishes to fire all three batteries of the battalion, he pushes a button to transmit data to all three. If one battery is already firing, a light informs the observer of this.

How can we mass more than one battalion on the same target? All the OP locations will have to be known and plotted on a master chart at division artillery, corps artillery, or group FDC. Data will be transmitted between these headquarters by radio or telephone. An element of the automatic computer at the battery position allows the operator there to "overrule" a battalion observer and join in a TOT on an important target when necessary. Data furnished by higher headquarters will then be fed into the computer, and the guns will be loaded and fired automatically.

Certainly, all of this is purely imaginary at present, but one only has to recall what our electronics engineers have produced in recent years to realize that, given the requirement they could produce such a system within the prescribed limitations of time, money, weight, and transportability.

LT. COL. JOHN C. FRALISH

Fly 'em in with Artillery Radar




MAJOR FRANK J. JANSEN

IN Korea limited experiments exhibited the use of field artillery radar equipment to track and control Army light aircraft, thus assisting pilots in the performance of night surveillance flights, airdrop of supplies and equipment, or illumination missions with aircraft flares. These techniques have since been further developed at Fort Sill.

The standard field artillery radar—the AN/MPQ-10—is a tracking type radar which graphically portrays the horizontal range, azimuth, and height data of the target being tracked. The AN/MPQ-10 can furnish all the information needed for the radar section to guide—vector—the aircraft to a predetermined point within the radar's range. It is done in three phases: preparation of initial data, guidance of the aircraft, and identification of the predetermined point.

The request for a vectoring mission contains the location of the predetermined point (or target) by coordinates or similar references that fix the location of the point on a map. The request also contains the location of the aircraft orbit or pick-up point. With these items known, the radar plotter computes the data necessary to make the initial pick-up of the aircraft at the orbit. With these data the operator searches for the aircraft. After the control-unit operator has identified the aircraft, the radar is set on full automatic. At this time the orbit and predetermined points are plotted on the plotting board (*see cut*).



The Plotting Scale showing the orbit and radar-target line

Once these plots are made, guidance begins. There is direct communication between the pilot of the aircraft and the controller at the radar. As soon as possible the general bearing of the aircraft is determined by obtaining three or four successive plots of the aircraft's position. This establishes a flight direction. The controller then transmits initial flight correction instructions. This correction should cause the aircraft to cross the radar-target (R) line.

As the aircraft approaches the predetermined point along the radar-target line, a short "down count" is transmitted to the pilot. Zero time in the down count corresponds to the exact moment the aircraft is over the point.

If the initial mission is not sufficiently accurate, adjustments can be relayed to the radar. Corrected data are then prepared and the aircraft is guided to a new release point.

These methods will guide an aircraft to a landing, and can be used in aerial photography, or in dropping supplies from relatively low altitudes. Additional factors are involved when dropping flares as the controller at the radar must inform the pilot of the precise moment to drop the flare. There are two methods to accomplish this. One is the use of fire direction center, and the other the use of the radar control center. In the first method, free fall and wind corrections are considered by the FDC and applied in the computations for the flare release point. In the second method the aircraft is vectored to a point over the target just as in an equipment drop, and the flares are released at the predetermined point.

THE MONTH'S READING

False Label

ROBERT S. BYFIELD
The Fifth Weapon
The Bookmailer, 1954

THIS includes many terms made familiar by the speeches and writings of Communists and their agents everywhere. Sir Gladwyn Jebb, the British delegate to the Security Council of the U.N., referred to mislabeling on the part of Mr. Malik of the U.S.S.R. as "upside-down language." M. Chauvel, the French delegate, told Mr. Malik, "You point to a table and call it a chair." Here is a partial glossary or dictionary of "upside-down language" through which the FALSE LABEL often becomes effective:

THE PEOPLE
: The Communists, their sympathizers or collaborators in any satellite nation or prospective satellite nation.

ENEMIES OF THE PEOPLE
: All anti-Communists, their sympathizers or collaborators in any satellite nation or prospective satellite nation.

TRAITOR
: A particularly active individual among the anti-Communists.

SLANDERER
: Anyone who tells the truth about the Soviet Union.

PEACE
: A condition of helplessness and indefensibility before the military might of the Soviet Union. A cloak for the dagger of subversion.

PEACE-LOVING
: Any nation, people or individual willing to cooperate with Moscow.

WAR
: Not necessarily the physical clash of men on a conventional battlefield, but propaganda, intrigue, assassination, policy diversion, sabotage, blackmail, economic pressure, infiltration, subversion, counterfeiting, agitation, kidnaping and shakedowns.

A Nation Mourns

CARL SANDBURG
Abraham Lincoln
Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1954

SHERMAN on his way to a conference with the Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston had a decoded telegram handed him from Stanton: "President Lincoln was murdered about 10 o'clock last night." Sherman pledged the operator to say nothing to anyone of the telegram. When Sherman and Johnston sat alone in a small farmhouse, Sherman handed over the telegram. Johnston read. On his forehead slowly came sweat "in large drops," as Sherman watched him, Sherman remembering so clearly and for so long a time afterwards how one of the greatest of Confederate captains said that "Mr. Lincoln was the best friend they had" and the assassination was "the greatest possible calamity to the South." In the surrender terms they were to sign, Sherman's motive, according to his keenest interpreter, probably ranged around a thought: "Lincoln is dead. I will make his kind of peace." . . .

Like a vast sunset of flame and changing gold ending a day and punctuating a period of time their faraway friend at Washington had vanished into the overhead planets and the same constellations of mist that had taken that long roll call of soldiers no longer answering "Here" to the company sergeant calling the names.

In a million and more American households they sought words that might help and assuage. "The land mourneth, every family apart," ran one Easter Sunday text. . . . On one arch of crape and white over Broadway in New York ran the sentence "The great person, the great man, is the miracle of history."

Soviet Military Leadership

HARRISON E. SALISBURY
American in Russia
Harper & Brothers, 1955

I HAVE always had, since those World War II days, great respect for the Soviet Army and its leaders. I saw a good bit of behind-the-lines operations of the Russian army and command and I shared the belief of most foreign observers who were in Russia during the war that it was a fine battle force, skillfully managed and led.

True, it did not resemble a Western army. Orders were usually verbal, not written. Paper work was practically nonexistent. Units often foraged for their own supplies. Generals were lavish in expending the lives of their soldiers and comfort and convenience were nonexistent by our standards. Men were sacrificed instead of materials because materials were scarce and men plentiful.

No doubt the United States could not operate an army like that of the Russians. No USO. No PX. No pin-ups. No movies. No packaged rations except what they got from us. Yet the fact remained that the Soviet troops fought the Germans to a standstill; that they withstood the shock of losing millions of men and much of their best equipment in the opening weeks of war (largely, I am certain, due to blunders by Stalin himself); they gave up thousands of square miles of homeland, including the best industrial regions and the Ukraine breadbasket—and yet the cadres were vast enough and strong enough and the leadership had sufficient resilience so that the Russians were able to turn the tide of battle and, inch by inch, drive the Germans from their soil. . . .

It seemed to me that the military minds which conceived and executed such bold and successful maneuvers as the operation in the vicinity of Moscow in November-December, 1941, which gave Hitler his first defeat since he had invented his blitzkrieg, or the brilliant encirclement at Stalingrad in the following year, December 1942-January, 1943, or the little-known (in the West) operations on the salient Kursk-Orel were forces which, eventually, the world would have to reckon with.

You Can't Go Home Again

The New York Times
December 1, 1954

WHEN the veteran got out of the service he made a point of visiting all the favorite places—the night clubs, ball fields, campuses—he had remembered so longingly while away. And to some extent each such visit was a failure. The places, most of them, were exactly the same. And there was the difficulty. They had not changed, grown, improved or deteriorated with the observer. The sick loneliness many a veteran felt on his first visit to the old familiar places perhaps lasted only an instant. Whether that or longer, it was not bittersweet nostalgic sentimentality. It was a reaction to severed lifelines and a drifting out of reach.

Such considerations are luxuries that only the live and the whole can indulge in, but they are a genuine part of the live and the whole. More poignant than places were the faces of pre-soldier friends who could no longer be friends. How many gay greetings were followed by an hour's deadly exchange of incomprehension? The common interests which only a few years before enabled two people to climb to wonderful heights along the alternating steps of each other's thought were gone. And in their place was no love, little sympathy and a merely intellectual understanding that made for caution and hypocrisy. Many old friends, of course, remained friends. But essentially they became new friends. All the half-conscious probing into convictions, ambitions and tastes had to be made again, as if the two were meeting for the first time. That was it: homecoming was a time for remaking, yet many veterans tried to make it a time for recovering. The physical and harsher spiritual devastation of World War II we all could see ten years ago. Some of the subtler changes perhaps have taken time to become visible.

Die—by the Numbers

The Canadian Military Journal
(Courtesy Canadian Sapper)
Christmas 1954

SUBJECT—DISCIPLINE

IT has been brought to the attention of A.H.Q. that there have been many cases within the units of men dying without permission or consent of their commanding officers. This practice will cease forthwith.

It must be clearly understood by all commanding officers and the men of their units, that the man power shortage is still acute and any man that dies without first obtaining permission commits an offence to which the only answer can be: Severe Disciplinary Action taken against him.

I have been instructed to bring to the notice of all Ranks, through their commanding officers, these instructions which WILL be shortly incorporated.

DYING—CONTROL OF
(the drill for)

. . . the following drill will be complied with by all Ranks of CAA Force.

1—No man below the Rank of A/U/L Cpl. will give the order to Die.

2—The man ordered to die will in all cases be known as the VICTIM and under no circumstances will he die on his own time. This is a Parade.

The following drill movements will be adhered to:

On receipt of the command DIE, the VICTIM will come smartly to attention and will then stagger 1 pace of 30 inches forward. This will be followed by 2 paces (short 23¼ inch.), at the same time allowing his eyes to glaze. This requires practice and a drill period should be held each week.

On the command "2" he will sink slowly but smartly down to his knees counting the correct drill time, 1 pause 2 pause three. On the count of three he will fall forward onto his face with arms outstretched and thumbs in line with ears, feet together.

There and then on the Victim's own time will he be allowed to draw his last breath on a CAF 512 Repayment properly signed by the Victim.

Before Dying, map of the Regimental Route to Heaven will be drawn (where applicable) clearly marked, from the QM stores. This route will be strictly adhered to. Unexpired portion of day's rations will be drawn from SQMS and devoured en route.

There will be no passing en route to heaven, and all ranks will pay the proper compliments to all officers passing en route to Subterranean depths.

REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS

On arrival at destination all ranks will report to Orderly Room ROYAL CANADIAN ANGEL CORPS for documentation. From there all Ranks will be issued with the following articles of kit:

HARPS—BASIC, playing with strings—pairs 1.

WINGS—General issue—pairs 1.

CLOUDS—General issue, Fleecy or cumulus—clouds 1.

WINGS

Wings will be BLANCOED daily with IT Stardust Drab No. 7. Harps will be cleaned brightly and highly tuned at all times. CLOUDS will be checked daily for condensation and filled with anti-freeze when necessary.

HALO FITTING

There will be a Halo fitting parade one hour after arrival.

DRESS

Very loose order, wings at the side and harps at the high port.

Signed: A. J. Q. Z. BLACK,
for PETER, Angel Commanding,
18 Royal Canadian Angel Corps Cloud Bank Depot.

3 | This Concerns You

COMBAT ARMS SCHOOL SELECTION

THE U.S. military service school system has proven beyond dispute its importance in developing necessary leadership in the defense establishment. It is possible, however, for an individual officer to distort the real influence attendance or nonattendance at a certain school will have upon his career. This condition is particularly true if he overlooks the fact that formal military education is used to offset deficiencies of actual experience. While attendance at military schools is certainly desirable, it is not in itself the final goal. Our large army offers opportunities for practical experience that is the equivalent of the concentrated teachings of the schools. In the final analysis the recognition an officer receives depends upon his accomplishments.

Regardless of how the reader perceives and evaluates the Army school system, he cannot help but recognize the complexities devolving on Career Management Division in the selection of officers for courses at service schools. Some of these include the establishment of an order of merit among eligible officers, the coordination of assignments with school attendance, the maintenance of uniformity of criteria, and the measurement of each individual's potential. As a solution to these problems, the combat arms branches of your Career Management Division have developed a systematic approach to the selection of officers for career schools. The standard scoring system devised gives weight to such factors in an officer's record as the level of the command positions which he has filled successfully, the degree of responsibility exercised by him as a staff officer, the amount of time he has spent with troops and in combat, the periods spent as an instructor, and the manner in which he has performed all duties.

Such an objective and uniform evaluation of each record, coupled with mature judgment, should detect those intangibles which properly separate those best qualified for school attendance.

Provision is made for separate consideration of specialists to compensate for the fact that their careers will not reflect the variety of assignments available to those not restricted by specialization.

CMD takes notice of the "hump" year groups so that an officer's opportunity for selection for school will not be adversely affected by the fact that he may have a disproportionately large number of contemporaries. This "fair share" distribution of available quotas gives all officers initially the same mathematical probability of selection prior to the qualitative comparison of records.

A by-product of the standard scoring system is the capability of the career branches to project with greater certainty those who will probably attend a selected school in the succeeding two or three years and whose assignments can thus be coordinated to permit attendance in conjunction with a normal permanent change of station. This projection has numerous advantages which accrue to the service and the individual in the form of greater stability, longer planning time and early notification to the officers selected.

Through reliance upon a uniform, systematic approach to school selection, the combat arms branches of CMD emphasize the importance of the individual officer's record speaking for him in the keen competition for school attendance.

THE tabulation in the chart on this page shows the conditions under which a Regular Army officer of a combat arm is eligible for consideration for career schools. It is essential that the individual officer recognize that eligibility alone does not assure attendance. The limited capacities of the colleges require that an officer must be better qualified than many of his contemporaries to warrant attendance. Waivers of eligibility criteria are rare and usually are granted only when outstanding officers have been unavailable for school because of overriding military necessity.

The inevitable question of an officer interested in further military schooling is, "What can I do to influence my selection?" The answer is as forthright as the query: "By performing all assigned duties with his utmost capability, and, whenever possible, by seeking new and greater responsibilities in command and staff assignments."

DIGEST OF FACTS RELATIVE TO EDUCATION OF REGULAR ARMY OFFICERS OF COMBAT ARMS

	Eligibility Factors				Approximate percentage of RA Officers of Combat Arms Who Will Attend	Numbers Now Attending	Approving Authority
	Years Promotion List Service	Age	Grade	Prior Education Required			
National War College	15-25			C&GSC	2.4	29	Chief of Staff
Industrial College of the Armed Forces	15-25			C&GSC	.5	6	Assistant Secretary of Army
Army War College	15-25			C&GSC	10.0	118	Chief of Staff
Naval War College (2d Year)	15-25			C&GSC	.2	4	Chief of Staff
Air War College	15-25		Col	C&GSC	.5	7	Chief of Staff
Armed Forces Staff College	10-21			C&GSC	6.5	39	Chief, CMD
Command & General Staff College							
Regular Course	8-15	41		Branch Advance	50.0	337	Chief, CMD
Associate Course	15-19	49		Branch Advance	5.0	30	Chief, CMD

THE WORD FROM THE SCHOOLS

THE INFANTRY SCHOOL

National Guard OCS

TIS will conduct a special Officer Candidate Course for National Guard NCOs and warrant officers this summer. The eight-week course is designed to train platoon leaders for Infantry National Guard units.

The course was first given in the summer of 1953 at Fort Riley, Kan., and it was continued last year at Fort Benning. There will be two classes this year, one running from 2 May through 8 July and the other from 13 June through 19 August.

Mine Warfare

TIS has begun instruction in the new mine warfare doctrine recommended by the Second Mine Warfare Panel. The new doctrine incorporates the use of a new and more effective minefield pattern, employing clusters of both antitank and antipersonnel mines; and a large single-sheet record form, including a lined section to facilitate sketching. The new pattern and record form are easier to teach and use than the multiple systems they replace.

Assault Firing

Tests are being conducted at TIS with a view to arriving at an additional firing table for the M1 Rifle Transition Course. The proposed table will test the firer's ability in assault firing during the final stages of an assault. Present plans indicate that hip firing will be permitted during the last 35 yards of the assault.

THE ARTILLERY SCHOOL

Helicopters Overhead

Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 45th Transportation Battalion (Helicopter) (Army), a helicopter transport company, and a maintenance detachment were activated at Fort Sill in January. This new command, in addition to providing transition training for graduates of the Army Aviation School at Fort Rucker, Ala., will be used in demonstrations for resident students of TAS as well as for reservists and national guardsmen on active-duty training. The units will receive H-34 helicopters on a monthly shipment basis. These larger helicopters will permit further experimentation in the TAS-developed technique of delivering artillery weapons to new positions by helicopter lift. Until now, major components of 105mm howitzers were transported to the firing position and reassembled there. The H-34s give promise of being able to transport 105mm howitzers complete, and major components of larger-caliber field artillery weapons.

Radio SOP Emphasizes Vigilance

TAS has developed an "SOP for Radio Conservation," which prescribes the minimum number of radios that must remain in operation during "radio conservation time." During periods of stabilized operations when wire communication is complete, and when an enemy attack is not imminent, it is desirable to conserve radio and associated motor equipment, as well as radio personnel, by temporarily closing down certain FM radio sets or radio nets. The possibility of unexpected situations, however, dictates that all unit radios should never be turned off at the same time, and that the off-the-air stations should be held in operational readiness.

The SOP stresses the following points:

(1) One FM radio set in both battalion and battery FDCs will keep operating on the battalion "K" and "A" channels. Depending on the Division Artillery Radio SOP, the battalion FDC may be required to have an additional set operating on the division artillery "K" and/or "A" channel.

(2) Liaison officers' and forward observers' sets may be turned off at this time, but will remain tuned to their assigned frequencies. Moreover, a wire communications check will be made to LnOs and FOs at least once every 30 minutes.

(3) All radio nets will be checked at least every two hours with all stations reporting in as directed.

(4) Wire checks will be made of all trunk lines and direct circuits every 30 minutes.

(5) All other FM radios in the battalion will be turned off, but all will contact the battalion FDC on their assigned frequency at the first indication of wire communication failure.

THE SIGNAL SCHOOL

Amphibious Training

Sixty-five Signal Corps officers attending advanced courses in TSS's Officer Department recently participated in an amphibious assault.

The group attended the five-day training session at the Marine Corps Amphibious School, Little Creek, Virginia. Supervised by Marine and Navy personnel, the training included classroom sessions, operational planning, actual amphibious landing, and rapid establishment of communications facilities on a beachhead.

On the first day of the training, the students were assembled on one side of a large auditorium, whose floor area represented a scale terrain map simulating water area and contingent beaches. They were shown an entire amphibious operation, including the approach of landing craft toward the beaches. To demonstrate air transport of assault troops, miniature helicopters, suspended by wires, were employed. Extensive use was made of "black light," a form of lighting by which boundaries or specific objects are illuminated by reflection without the source of light being visible.

Other demonstrations were made on large terrain boards of the techniques of naval gunfire and close air support, by use of mechanical and electronic devices. Problems involved in firing at night and under poor visibility conditions were explained.

On the morning of the amphibious exercise, the students boarded the USS *Burleson*, where equipment was again checked, and the officers were instructed in the method of going "over the side."

The movement to the beaches was made in approximately twenty minutes, during which radio contact was main-

tained with the control boat. Since an ebb tide made it impossible for the landing craft to go all the way to the beaches, they ran aground on sand bars a short distance from the beaches. Students and members of the faculty waded ashore in the icy waters of Chesapeake Bay.

Operations on the beach consisted of a ship-to-shore command post exercise during which the students were exposed to all the problems confronting a communicator during an amphibious assault. It was the task of the students to establish wire and radio communications for a simulated task force the size of an infantry division. Two regiments of the division comprised the attacking force.

Communications were established in rapid order, with command nets opening eight minutes after the first teams made the landing. Wire communications to regiments from the division advance command post were established immediately after the latter group had made its landing.

THE ENGINEER SCHOOL

Traveling Instruction Team

A special Engineer Generator Maintenance Instruction team from TES is moving across the country giving special maintenance instructions to tactical field units and batteries of the Antiaircraft Artillery Command. The instruction is concentrated on the new 400-cycle generator equipment used to operate the Nike defense systems. Constant and considerable maintenance is required for the large number of generators that are being operated on an around-the-clock schedule.

The special team consists of one officer and four enlisted men, all of whom are capable instructors fully qualified in all phases of generator theory and operation.

Home base for the team is the electronics section of the Electronics and Utilities Branch, Department of Mechanical and Technical Equipment, TES. This section has the primary responsibility for training enlisted specialists who maintain and repair the Army's special electronic devices and weapons.

While on tour, the team carries the various charts and training aids required for complete and detailed instruction. The team stays at each installation an average of four days, the duration of the visit varying according to the number of personnel requiring instruction. TES, the Office of the Chief of Engineers, and the Antiaircraft Artillery Command coordinate the activities of the special team.

The team has been on its present mission about four months. Upon completion of its tour of instruction sometime in May 1955, the members will resume their normal duties as instructors in the regular courses at the Electronics Branch, TES.

Tactical Maps

Maps are so important in modern war of movement that map makers with truck-mounted reproducing equipment follow closely behind front-line troops. Success in battle requires that objects be precisely located on a map for infantry and armored attack, and that map targets be pinpointed for artillery, air and missile concentrations.

TES has complete facilities and equipment, including the topographic vans used in the field, to train personnel for the map reproduction mission of the Corps of Engineers. An annual average of 150 enlisted specialists learn the entire offset press operation at Fort Belvoir, and they actually turn out finished maps in standard colors on topographic equipment similar to that used in the field. The enlisted course is eight weeks long, and an officer course of two weeks' duration is planned to start this year. Reserve topographic units attend a special two-week course at Fort Belvoir.

Grading Performance Tests

Large classes, scarcity of instructors, and complex subject matter make performance testing extremely difficult. Yet performance tests are the only valid measure of learning in many mechanical courses.

TES has recently developed a method for administering performance tests in mechanical subjects by setting up a rigid test situation.

For example, in a maintenance test on crane shovels, many short mechanical adjustments are devised. All necessary tools are laid out on each side of twelve crane shovels, with two students and an instructor-observer on each shovel. Limited time, precise instructions, and experienced observers ensure objectivity.

The improvements in performance tests at TES give students' grades greater validity than ever before. They form a basis for better classification and assignment of graduating students.

Further information on these developments in performance testing may be obtained by writing to: The Engineer School, Fort Belvoir, Va., ATTN: Educational Advisor.

THE MONTH'S FILMS

Each month in this space Captain Jack F. McAhon, who is in charge of motion picture distribution for the Pictorial Branch, Department of Defense OPI, reports on the new films available to the services.

A new series of films, known as the Officers' Conference series, is designed to stimulate thinking about world problems. The films two of which are already in the libraries, take the form of interviews in which students at the National War College question American statesmen about their particular fields. In the first, **Soviet Objectives, OC-1** (58 minutes), George Kennan, former Ambassador to the USSR, is interviewed. In the second, **Which Way the Germans? OC-2** (42 minutes), the expert is Walter Bedell Smith, former Under Secretary of State and World War II Chief of Staff of SHAEF.

Film Bulletin 281 (10 minutes) is the latest in series "Infantry Weapons and Their Effects." A color film, it covers the 57mm, 75mm, and 105mm recoilless rifles, their ammunition and capabilities.

Icecap I, FB 286 (30 minutes), covers a trip taken in 1952 by the U.S. Army Transportation Corps to the Greenland Icecap to test equipment designed for transporting men and supplies to advance bases in cold climates.

Loads and Loading of General Transport Vehicles, TF-1918 (18 minutes), stresses that loading is the responsibility of the operator of the vehicle. It also covers the principles of loading and safety precautions to be observed.

M-1937 Field Range Fire Unit, TF 10-1960 (36 minutes), is a useful film for Army cooks. It reviews the component parts of the M-1937 and their functions, and it explains the assembly and disassembly of the unit, the principles of operation, and safety precautions.

A helpful aid for officers planning to use training films is the **Index of Army Motion Pictures and Film Strips, SR 110-1-1.** The "Index" has four supplements, which bring it up to date as of June, 1954. It will soon be superseded, however, by DA Pamphlet 108-1.

THE MONTH'S BOOKS

Diplomats and Soldiers

CIVILIZATION AND FOREIGN POLICY:
An Inquiry for Americans
By Louis J. Halle
Harper & Brothers, 1955
277 Pages; 3.75

Reviewed by
BRIG. GEN. DONALD ARMSTRONG

Over a century ago Alexis de Tocqueville warned us Americans that "it is especially in the conduct of their foreign relations that democracies appear to me decidedly inferior to other governments." Certainly the failure until recent years to integrate military and foreign policy has vastly diminished our ability to gain our national objectives without burdensome cost in lives and resources. There can be little doubt that if soldiers and diplomats were more familiar with one another's problems and principles of action, our democracy would be in a stronger posture of defense.

Consequently there is good reason to rejoice in the appearance of this excellent book. It is written by a diplomat who in 1951 was assigned to the National War College for an academic year. It shows that at last diplomats and soldiers in the United States are working together. The book is extraordinarily readable, a rare quality in a study of this sort. It has the closely reasoned and logical approach to its conclusions that soldiers are accustomed to in a military estimate of the situation. It gives a clear view of the challenge to our policy-makers today.

The American people need this book. The thinkers and the planners in the combat forces should welcome it as a companion volume for their manuals of strategy. Soldiers long ago formalized in the principles of strategy the pragmatic sanction of military theory. Nothing comparable had been done in the theory of foreign policy, at least in this country. As Dean Acheson writes in his appreciative introduction, Mr. Halle's "adequate body of theory" "helps amazingly."

Mr. Halle examines the kind of nation we have become, the kind of world that forms our environment and the challenge we face today. As a nation dedicated to the dignity of the individual man, we are repelled by governmental regimentation and thought control. American foreign policy, therefore, must be directed to the task of making our civilization strong enough to resist the attack of barbarism from without.

This mission demands an orderly examination of the power available to us—not so much a specific analysis of military or naval strength, of our economic resources or of the other elements of our national power, but rather the significance of a balance of power system and the legitimate use of force to win friends, influence peoples, and prevent our enemies from gaining their ends.

The soldier may well ask what Mr. Halle's theories lead to in matters in which the combat forces have a primary concern. Fortunately the author has defined the requisite practical application of theory in these recommended military policies:

"In order to realize the objective of deterring a nuclear attack by our opponents and the further objectives of deterring or frustrating other kinds of military aggression we need:

"(a) To maintain a nuclear offensive power of our own sufficient to make the probable cost to our opponent of starting a nuclear war unacceptable;

"(b) To protect that power and the nation on which it is based by provisions for defense against nuclear attack that would discourage our opponent from undertaking to incapacitate us and destroy our nuclear capability by a surprise attack;

"(c) To develop and maintain such military forces as would deter or, at least, frustrate any military attack of a more traditional nature, in the event that the nuclear power on both sides was such as to deter either side from using it against the population centers or industries of the other."

Such a program is costly in the extreme, but Mr. Halle reminds us that if we balk at the high price of survival "we would be repeating the mistake of the Carthaginians who, like us, enjoyed an incomparably high standard of living but would not take away from it for the sake of their own survival."

The Return


THE U. S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
Leyte: The Return to the Philippines
By M. Hamlin Cannon
Office of the Chief of Military History, 1954
420 Pages; Illustrated; Maps; Index; $6.75

Reviewed by
COL. ROBERT F. COCKLIN

In American strategic planning, the invasion of Leyte was never envisioned as a decisive battle. The primary purpose of the campaign was to establish an air and logistical base in the Leyte area in order to support operations in the Luzon, Formosa, and China areas. However, the Japanese high command determined that if the American forces were to be defeated in the Philippines, it would have to be done by driving them from Leyte before they gained a strong foothold. Thus Leyte did become a decisive battleground. The Japanese lost a major portion of their naval and air forces and weakened large army units originally intended for the defense of Luzon.

In this fifth volume of the Pacific subseries of the Army's World War II history, Dr. Cannon provides a detailed, well-organized and fully documented text. He makes it clear that in some respects American planning and execution of the operation were faulty. Though the Japanese

General Douglas MacArthur on Leyte in October 1944 talks over plans with division commanders. From *Leyte: The Return to the Philippines*



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were dealt a severe blow, the original objectives of the campaign were never fully realized. The Japanese gained the initiative several times in the campaign and American commanders were often hard-pressed to regain it.

We did triumph in the end, and this account of how victory was achieved is a fine tribute to the tenacity, courage, and ingenuity of American soldiers and sailors. It was the largest Pacific campaign up to that time from the point of troops, with some 257,766 American troops opposing roughly 70,000 Japanese. American casualties numbered over 15,500, including more than 3,500 killed and 12,000 wounded. Japanese casualties were considerably higher. Two Japanese commanders estimate that between 50,000 and 60,000 Japanese lost their lives in the Leyte operation.

Despite the large numbers of troops involved, the battle for Leyte was essentially a series of actions involving smaller units. On orders from Imperial General Headquarters, Japanese commanders abandoned the strong beach fortifications they had been preparing in their policy for "annihilation on the beachhead" and turned to resistance in depth. They made effective use of the swampy and mountainous terrain and prolonged the campaign far beyond the original timetable.

If there is any basic defect in Dr. Cannon's work, it is an overemphasis on small-unit actions, which at times obscures the army, corps, and division tactics as well as those at the regimental and battalion level.

It is to his credit, though, that the author keeps very much in mind the objectives for which the battle was fought. In this instance, American high-level planning was faulty. Prior to the decision to make the Leyte invasion, Colonel William J. Ely, executive to the Sixth Army engineer, protested against the employment of Leyte as a major supply and air force base. Colonel Ely pointed out that the operation would be launched in the season of heavy rains, high winds, and typhoons. The harbor was so shallow and so obstructed by coral that approaches would have to be as much as 800 feet long. He pointed out that the flat Leyte Valley was interlaced by many streams and rice paddies and that the soil was so unstable that it would be almost impossible to lengthen or establish air strips and supply depots without tremendous efforts to haul rock. Finally, he pointed out that the existing road and bridge nets were so narrow that they could handle only one-way traffic and would undoubtedly disintegrate under pounding by military vehicles and the rains. His prophecies were substantiated to the letter, and Leyte was never satisfactory as a base.

The Leyte campaign made an important contribution in still another respect. At the same time the Japanese were losing an important battle, American top commands, notably Sixth Army and X and XXIV Corps, were gaining valuable experience that stood them in fine stead for the Battle of Luzon which followed. There were many important lessons learned, many of which will be a part of our army training for years to come. General Walter Krueger, who commanded Sixth Army on Leyte, issued a memorandum to his commanders which may well be pondered by commissioned officers from now on. His memorandum was prompted by the fact that as late as ten days after the landings, no unit—including the higher headquarters—was operating a mess or serving hot meals. Although there was considerable rain and mud, few units made any effort to get their men under shelter even when the tactical situation permitted. Night after night, officers and men slept in wet foxholes even when no enemy troops were in shooting distance. Krueger wasn't pleased. This is what he had to say: "It must never be forgotten that the individual soldier is the most important single factor in this war. He is expected to do a lot, including risking his life. But to get the most out of him he must have the feeling that everything possible under existing circumstances is being done for his well-being and comfort. This is a prime responsibility of command. . ."

General Krueger's overall excellence as a combat leader is often attested to as the Leyte campaign unfolds in Dr. Cannon's work. The military virtues of General MacArthur likewise come into sharper focus in this account than in several of the highly emotional books which have been eulogizing him in recent months. We see him here in his proper role as Supreme Commander, making the major decisions and setting the policy, and then turning over the execution to his subordinate commanders without trying constantly to look over their shoulders. For example, one recent book attributed the decision to make the enveloping landing at Ormoc to the tactical sagacity of General MacArthur. The factual material presented here shows clearly that this maneuver was planned and executed by the army commander, General Krueger, as it properly should have been.

Melodramatic Day

THE DAY LINCOLN WAS SHOT
By Jim Bishop
Harper & Brothers, 1954
308 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $3.75

Reviewed by
LT. COL. WILLARD WEBB

The fourteenth day of April, 1865, was certainly a melodramatic day in the history of the United States, filled with incredible plotting and planning, culminating in national tragedy. It was a day so replete with melodramatic significance that no sophisticated drama critic would accept it. The day has fascinated Mr. Bishop, as it has many other people. Over a long period of time he has collected the fragments of the story of that day and put them together in a quite readable sequence.

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260 Pages

A Selected Check List of the Month's Books

This run-down of some of the books received for review during the month preceding our deadline is to give our readers who like to follow current literature a monthly check list of the most important, useful and potentially popular books. Full reviews of some of these books will appear in this or subsequent issues. Any of these titles may be purchased through the Combat Forces Book Service. See page 64 for order coupon and a complete listing of Selected Books for Military Readers.

ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORY. By Admiral Husband E. Kimmel. Henry Regnery Company, 1955. 208 Pages; $3.75. Admiral Kimmel's side of one of the most controversial questions of all time. A man who deserves to be heard has his say; the rights and wrongs have not yet been resolved.

AFRICA TODAY. Edited by C. Grove Haines. The Johns Hopkins Press, 1955. 510 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $6.00. Twenty-four articles designed to offer a comprehensive picture of the Dark Continent as it is now.

AMERICAN IN RUSSIA. By Harrison E. Salisbury. Harper & Brothers, 1955. 328 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $4.00. A *New York Times* correspondent's narrative of five years in Russia.

THE AMERICAN LEGION AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. By Roscoe Baker. Bookman Associates, 1955. 329 Pages; Index; $4.75. Written by a Legionnaire, this is something more than an apology and something less than a whitewash.

BLACKBURN'S HEADHUNTERS. By Philip Harkins. W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1955. 326 Pages; $3.75. For those who enjoyed Volckmann's *We Remained*, this story of Colonel Blackburn's efforts as a guerrilla in the Philippines will be even more readable and more exciting.

CASANOVA. By Hermann Kesten. Harper & Brothers, 1955. 396 Pages; $5.00. An amusing and light biography of the great lover. Also valuable for its sidelights on the history of Europe in the eighteenth century.

ESCAPER'S PROGRESS. By David James. W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1955. 205 Pages; $3.00. Another in the long series of POW escape stories—this one by a British torpedo-boat officer who escaped from the Germans.

THE FIFTH WEAPON. By Robert S. Byfield. The Bookmailer, 1955. 67 Pages; $1.00. A study of Russian propaganda and psychological warfare.

THE FRENCH THEORY OF THE NATION IN ARMS 1866-1939. By Richard D. Challener. Columbia University Press, 1955. 305 Pages; Index; $4.50. A scholarly and well documented work which can be of value to our own manpower and mobilization experts.

HAWAII UNDER ARMY RULE. By J. Garner Anthony. Stanford University Press, 1955. 203 Pages; Index; $5.00. A critical account of martial law in Hawaii by the lawyer who persuaded the U. S. Supreme Court that parts of it were unjustified, with full text of basic documents.

INDEX-DIGEST AND ANNOTATIONS TO THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE. By Col. Lee S. Tillotson. The Military Service Publishing Company, 1955. 505 Pages; $4.00. Third edition of a popular text.

LOW NOTES ON A HIGH LEVEL. By J. B. Priestley. Harper & Brothers, 1955. 160 Pages; $2.75. Fine if you like the type of British humor that lies somewhere between P. J. Wodehouse and Dickens.

THE MISSING MACLEANS. By Geoffrey Hoare. The Viking Press, Inc., 1955. 247 Pages; Illustrated; $3.75. Written for the soap opera audience, this leaves too many gaps to be particularly informative and treads rather closely to the sob-sister line.

PERSPECTIVE OF JAPAN. Intercultural Publications, Inc., 1955. 78 Pages; Illustrated; 35¢. Leading Japanese writers write on religion, economics, literature, social changes, architecture, etc. Well illustrated with ten reproductions of Japanese art in color. The material originally appeared in the *Atlantic Monthly*.

THE RESERVIST'S GUIDE AND RECORD. By Major Daniel J. Kern and Lt. Comdr. George L. Cantzlaar. David McKay Company, Inc., 1955. 277 Pages; $3.50. A record book and guide combined. The main difficulty with the book is the fact that there will have to be a flood of new editions to keep up with changes in regulations.

THE SUSQUEHANNA. By Carl Carmer; Illustrated by Stow Wengenroth. Rinehart & Company, Inc., 1955. 493 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $5.00. The Susquehanna is a river particularly rich in American history and Carl Carmer will not disappoint his own fans or those who collect this outstanding Rivers of America series.

TIME OUT FOR TURKEY. By David Dodge. Random House, 1955. 235 Pages; $3.50. A humorously written travelogue from the French Riviera to Turkey. Very amusing but hardly a guide book for the serious traveler.

THE TWO JACKS. By Will R. Bird. Macrae-Smith Company, 1955. 209 Pages; Illustrated; $3.50. Still another POW escape story—this one of two Canadians who worked with the French Resistance after getting away from the Germans.

UNDERSTANDING THE FRENCH. By Elliot Paul. Random House, 1955. 186 Pages; $2.75. A sympathetic interpretation of what makes the Frenchman tick.

THE WASHINGTON PAPERS. Edited and with an introduction by Saul K. Padover. Harper & Brothers, 1955. 430 Pages; Index; $5.00. A one volume treasury of the important writings of George Washington.

THE WORLD IS SIX FEET SQUARE. By Alan Caillou. W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1955. 255 Pages; $3.00. A personal experience story of two young British intelligence officers captured by the enemy while working with the Arabs in the Western Desert.

THE WORLD'S FIGHTING PLANES. By William Green and Gerald Pollinger. Hanover House, 1955. 240 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $3.50. Photographs and three-elevation silhouettes of most of the planes we have heard of and many that will be new to all but the experts.

THE YUKON. By Arthur Cherry Hinton with Philip H. Godsell. Macrae-Smith Company, 1955. 184 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $3.50. An illustrated and thrillingly written history of an area that is becoming more and more important to the defense of the United States.

The book covers 24 hours 22 minutes, from 0700, 14 April, to 0722 (the minute that Lincoln died), 15 April. While the naming of the chapters is by hour through the day, the author has reached back for some retrospective material in a chapter entitled "The Days Before." While this is a well-organized job of editing the information already known, it adds no knowledge which does not already exist in printed form; in fact, Mr. Bishop's bibliography does not include such well-known works as those of Otto Eisenschiml.

This author concerns himself very little with the mystery of the assassination plot. He simply narrates the events as the record indicates they occurred. He apparently accepts the statement of the superintendent of telegraphs that the reason all of the telegraph lines out of Washington went out of operation immediately following Lincoln's assassination was because of the purely casual and incidental mistaken crossing of wires in the telegraph office. Mr. Bishop makes no effort to evaluate the possible significance of John Surratt in the plot and the possibility that he may have had contacts in connection with wartime espionage which were useful to the group of little punks who surrounded John Wilkes Booth. The book does make the statement concerning Mrs. Surratt that "there is no corroborative evidence to show that she ever knew anything of the plot." A military court and a number of subsequent historians have had a reasonable doubt that she was innocent. He draws no implication from the fact that Lincoln's guard left his post and was not even reprimanded, and he sees nothing sinister in the sentry on the Navy Yard bridge allowing Herold and Booth, and only them, to pass.

Since Washington's geography is discussed in some detail, it is unfortunate

that it is not discussed more accurately. A map is shown on the endsheets and also reprinted in connection with the title page. However, it is done on such a small scale that it is difficult to use, and while Mr. Bishop talks in some detail of Washington's geography it is apparent that his knowledge of that geography is somewhat hazy. He refers to South Capitol Street as Capitol South and refers to the "upper reaches of Wisconsin Avenue in Georgetown." Numbered streets in Washington run north and south, but he says "to the west of the theatre—toward F Street—was Ferguson's Restaurant." Toward F Street from the theatre is north, and not west. He describes Grant as "the little giant." This is the first time I have ever seen such an appellation applied, but it was applied to Senator Douglas. In one place he refers to "cadre of dejected prisoners." This is, to say the least, a nonmilitary use of the word "cadre." He accepts without question the fact that Stanton said, when Lincoln died, "Now he belongs to the ages." Some unusual imagery is used in such phrases as describing an individual as having "poached eyes."

The story of the Lincoln assassination conspiracy remains one of the tantalizing mysteries of history, and Mr. Bishop has written an interesting summary of much of what is known.

Lost Cause

THE BRIGHT SWORD
By Eleanor Perényi
Rinehart & Company, 1955
309 Pages; $3.50

Reviewed by
COLONEL R. ERNEST DUPUY

John Bell Hood—his intimates called him "Sam"—was a fine figure of a man as well as a dashing leader. The son of a Kentucky small-time farmer, he graduated from West Point in 1853. Resigning at the outbreak of the Civil War, he became first the adored commander of a Texas brigade, then—upon the recommendation of both Jackson and Longstreet—a major general, leading a division in the latter's corps. Always in the forefront of battle, he had suffered an arm wound at Gettysburg.

Our story opens with Hood and his division rattling westward over the rails; Longstreet's corps is going to reinforce Bragg; Hood himself, as it turns out, to leave a leg at Chickamauga. What happens afterward, in love and in war, to a peglegged 32-year-old major general filled with ambition and soldierly spirit, is the theme of one of the most delightfully written historical novels this reviewer has read in many a moon.

Wisely, the author has restricted narration of actual combat to a few well-done fragments, filled with color and movement. The major portion of the book concerns the progress of Hood's courtship of a proud FFV belle, carried on in the midst of war-torn Richmond's Alice in Wonderland existence in 1863-64. Beautiful Buck Campbell and her soldier lover, Sam Hood, are caught in the network of political rivalries, military jealousies and aristocratic fantasies. What might have turned into just another mawkish love story is saved by Eleanor Perényi's splendid characterization and dramatic ability.

Hood's emotions flash before the reader; from the crescendo of army command, the frustration of Atlanta's siege, the quick-ended hopes of his ill-considered offensive in the Franklin and Nashville campaigns, down into the slough of despond when his army cracks and he is relieved. It would be unfair to the author to reveal the final outcome, although many readers may suspect it.

A good story, and a fine historical pictorialization of a short-lived and fantastic epoch in our national life. An amazing background of historical research must have gone into it.

Curmudgeon's Report

THE SECRET DIARY OF HAROLD L. ICKES
Volume III: The Lowering Clouds, 1939-41
Simon & Schuster, 1954
695 Pages; $6.00

Reviewed by
LT. COL. H. A. DEWEERD

FDR's Cabinet had more big-time diarists than any other in history. Secretary of War Stimson and Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau kept very detailed and voluminous diaries. Forrestal left a valuable but briefer diary. Hull and Leahy have written their memoirs. Perkins wrote a book about Roosevelt. Now we have the third volume of a diary kept by the most aggressively honest and cantankerous member of the Roosevelt team—Harold Ickes, longtime Secretary of the Interior. Ickes attracted controversy as a magnet attracts iron. He was always in trouble with someone, but usually in defense of what Ickes thought was the public welfare. He clashed with Willkie, Wallace, Hopkins, Garner, Farley, and Woodring.

This volume of his diary covers the story of the Roosevelt Administration from the fall of 1939 to the entrance of the United States into the war in 1941. It was not kept on a day-to-day basis. Ickes was too busy for that sort of journalistic activity. He dictated it in batches during moments of leisure. Despite his apparently accurate memory, this kind of a diary has less historical value than one written immediately after the events described.

President Roosevelt never had a more loyal subordinate than Harold Ickes. This was true despite the increasing disillusionment Ickes suffered on account of the President's sloppy methods of administration and his repeated delays in carrying out promises. Throughout the period covered in this volume Ickes was deeply exercised over the President's failure to transfer Forestry from the Department of Agriculture to the Department of the Interior. He promised Ickes he would do this sev-

ORDERS AND DIRECTIVES is a compact handbook of good procedure chock-full of pertinent and valuable information. I have "put it to work" in my own office.

Colonel QMC



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eral times but excused himself on the ground of political expediency.

After the outbreak of war in 1939, Ickes wanted the President to take a stronger stand on the revision of neutrality legislation. After France fell, he wanted a larger measure of military support for Britain. He opposed trade with Japan in strategic materials, particularly oil. In this field his efforts to turn off the spigot ran counter to Roosevelt's policy of attempting to string Japan along until the Western allies were in a better military posture. But in spite of Ickes's concern for these things, this diary is of greatest value as a revelation of the nature of the politics at the top in Washington.

Ickes draws sharp pictures of his political associates. Hull is portrayed as affecting the pose of a Christian martyr in Cabinet meetings. Hopkins appears as an incessant intriguer determined "to keep his place under the President's bed"; Perkins is shown taxing the patience of the Cabinet with her regular one-hour lectures "on the nature of government." Ickes's story of the confusion and intrigue of the Chicago convention of 1940 is in a class by itself. It shows Roosevelt's political methods at their very worst. One should point out, however, that Ickes was among the many Democrats who considered themselves a better Vice Presidential choice than Henry Wallace.

Interestingly enough, the one job in Washington, outside of the Interior, which seemed to attract Ickes (aside from the Vice Presidency) was the War Department. Along with LaGuardia, Jackson and others, Ickes considered himself a leading candidate to succeed Woodring, after the President finally acted on his repeated promises to put a strong man in as Secretary of War. Ickes admired Stimson but frankly thought he was too old for the post in time of crisis.

Recommended for students of national affairs.

Officers' Mess

THE WOOLWICH MESS
By Lt. Col. Alfred H. Burne, DSO
Gale & Polden, Ltd., 1954
94 Pages; Illustrated; Index

Reviewed by
COLONEL R. ERNEST DUPUY

How does one tell the story of a unit mess?

Someone once said that the soul of a regiment is its colors. Perhaps it is equally true that the heart of a regiment is its headquarters officers' mess. At least this reviewer so believes. Colonel Burne, whose well-written and interesting *Lee, Grant and Sherman* is well known to many American officers, has not been too effective in his presentation of the Woolwich Mess.

This is the story of the officers' mess of Her Majesty's Royal Regiment of Artillery, whose guns have spoken the world over since its founding in 1716, as its proud motto, *Ubique*, indicates. The story should be a pulsating and inspiring one, filled with human interest. Colonel Burne, however, has chosen to present it in the form of a dry staff study enlivened here and there by all too few anecdotes.

Now the Royal Artillery Mess, situated at Woolwich, home of the Royal Military Academy, has a parallel in our own West Point Mess. We also have—or had—the old 1st Artillery Mess, established at Houlton, Maine, in 1842, and still in being at Fort Totten in 1917, although the regiment had ceased to exist. These are only two of many American army messes, of which all too little is known.

The value of this book lies in the store of historical fact buried in its pages. As a reference work it should have a place on the shelves of everyone interested in the British Army.

Memorial to the Aussies

WITH THE AUSTRALIANS IN KOREA
Edited by Norman Bartlett
The Australian War Memorial Canberra ACT
293 Pages

Reviewed by
COLONEL CHARLES W. MCCARTHY

This is both a contribution to the history of the Korean episode and a memorial to the Australians who participated. Let us first consider the contribution it makes to historical literature.

In many respects this book has the atmosphere of a unit history and as such, like many unit histories, is dull reading for those without association with the units involved. Coupled with this dullness is confusion since the book tries to cover not one unit but several units and these drawn from the three Armed Services. We become acquainted with the efforts of three battalions of the Royal Australian Regiment, an infantry unit, the 77th Squadron, Royal Australian Air Force, a fighter unit, a transport squadron of the Royal Australian Air Force, and several units of the Royal Australian Navy including the carrier *Sydney*. And right here we have discovered a basic fault which will make the book a difficult problem for students or researchers.

Nowhere is there a complete list of the forces that participated. It is necessary to thumb through the book to find the units unless one has a facile memory. There is no effort to compile those statistics so important to military students such as number of men engaged, casualties (battle and non-battle), sorties flown and other information which indicates the degree of participation.

The maps are few and poor while the illustrations are plentiful and excellent.

The book is divided into two parts. The first is a running account of participation by the Australian forces, land, sea, and air.

The second part is a collection of eighteen sketches or essays, "Told By Those Who Served." These range from an excellent piece of writing by Roy Macartney of the Australian Associated Press, "How War Came to Korea," to some rather immature efforts written in a style imitative of Ernie Pyle. However, this part of the book is good reading with humor and fine description in many instances. This kind of treatment might be considered in unit histories since, by devoting a special section to reporting outstanding instances, these events may be placed in their proper perspective instead of being lost in the main body of the history.

Without an intimate knowledge of the country or the people one could be wrong; but the impression gained from the book is that the Australians are the Texans of the British Commonwealth of Nations. They didn't "bugout." They only withdrew because some American commander ordered it. If a unit suffered a reverse, it was often because of the failure to perform on the part of some American supporting unit. They did not try to "bash their way through" as American units did, but by the application of proper tactics achieved their objectives with the minimum of loss. All of this may be very true but the telling of it without the proper maps and other statistical data to support it leaves the reader a little cold.

Most of the book is devoted to the part played by the Royal Australian Regiment although the Air Units (and they were in action in the very early days) and the Navy receive a fair amount of attention.

As a memorial this book will live in the hands of veterans and on the bookshelves of homes throughout Australia. It is an intimate book about Australians for Australians. Let the great historians of the future bother with the detailing of the cold facts and figures of history.

An Australian of Mr. Kipling's making, while fighting in South Africa in the Boer War, said ". . . the big things pass and the little things remain." The editors of the Australian War Memorial are endeavoring to ensure that there will remain in Australia for many years to come a memory of the sons and brothers of their countrymen who died on far Korean hillsides for a good cause.

Doctrine for Disaster

THE FRENCH THEORY OF THE NATION IN ARMS 1866-1939
By Richard D. Challener
Columbia University Press, 1955
305 Pages; Bibliography; Index; $4.50

Reviewed by
MAJ. EPPES W. BROWNE, JR.

"The Nation in Arms" is a slippery concept, which Mr. Challener admits is difficult of definition. Its essence was fear and distrust of a professional Regular Army, and a mystical—and highly impractical—reliance on a huge National Army of partly-trained reservists mobilized *en masse* on M-day. In the 1860s, this was a political concept, the military insisting on a seven-year enlistment "old soldier" army, wanting no part of the reserves. Subsequently,

the Army High Command accepted the concept too, and nobody listened to the few dissenting voices (such as Col. de Gaulle in the 1930s).

The political doctrine dated from the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, when the armed French citizenry defeated mercenary troops over most of Europe. Those glorious days dazzled French political and military thought for a century and a half, with disastrous results from frozen doctrine in a fluid world.

Because 1870 was a blitz war, later French plans were based solely on the short, quick war, ignoring entirely lessons of the American Civil War and the Boer War. The 1914 plan required complete military mobilization and stockpiles of ammunition, but no economic mobilization. (No heavy artillery; it reduced mobility too much.) Challener says:

> "In brief, the commercial and business world shut down, political life came to an abrupt termination, and—in a very real sense—France herself adjourned, *sine die*, to await the news from the battlefront."

Even ordnance procurement shut down and went off to war.


Briey on the border (Pittsburgh is a fair parallel) was abandoned early in August 1914 because it was not readily defensible. It took four years to recover, four years of steel shortage in a war of attrition. Vast amounts of improvisation in economic mobilization, and returning men from the front to run factories and railroads, were necessary before 1918. The ammunition stockpiles didn't last through September 1914.

The French learned their lesson from World War I. Defense was superior to offense, particularly when supported by complete economic and military mobilization. The Nation in Arms now included both sexes and all ages to man and supply the Maginot Line. The peacetime Army became a mere training school for one-year reserve classes (read: UMT).

Again they planned it in detail, so that they could have mobilized a million men in 1936, when Hitler invaded the Rhineland, but could not field one corps to push the Germans out. Protecting the Rhineland would have put the French Army in *front* of the Maginot Line; they weren't prepared for that.

They couldn't defend west of the Line, either, in 1940, but Challener doesn't cover that action adequately.

A scholarly work (488 footnotes), this book is not for general military readers. [Ask yourself: "Am I a scholar?"] Unfortunately, it appears to be addressed to the academicians. A simpler version, stripped (perhaps by the War College) of the minutiae of French parliamentary debate and similar barbed-wire entanglements, might be of considerable value to the Congress, the State and Defense Departments, Selective Service, and Civil Defense.



Pass In Review

It is saddening to observe the occasional inroads of tarnish on the shining armor of one's heroes. There is for me, however, one gallant soldier-statesman whose luster remains undimmed. He is that master of many trades, Sir Winston Churchill. Having given the benefit of my prejudiced point of view, let me call attention to a new book on my favorite subject. *Assignment Churchill* ($3.75) is written by Inspector Walter Henry Thompson of Scotland Yard, who spent some nineteen years as Churchill's personal bodyguard. Obviously, in such a close association over such an extended period, Thompson came to know his subject well. Thompson's memoirs make fascinating reading and provide a unique picture of Sir Winston from an unusual angle.

For crossword puzzle fans or those with a geographical bent, there is a new reference book just out that will be most useful. *The Macmillan World Gazetteer and Geographical Dictionary* ($6.95) covers in detail all sorts of information on the countries, cities, oceans, rivers, lakes and climates of the world from Aabenraa (Denmark) to Zwolle (Netherlands). Even though the subjects are arranged in alphabetical order, a supplementary index makes the book even easier to use. There is also a list of abbreviations and contractions.

Since my job has been to keep up with the books being published, I have been impressed with the number of works that are produced to improve the quality of our luncheon or after-dinner speaking. One must assume that the ranks of these captive audiences are well populated with long-suffering authors. At any rate, the publishers seem to be doing their best to improve things. The latest contribution is *The Speaker's Handbook of Epigrams and Witticisms* ($3.95) by Herbert V. Prochow. This comprehensive anthology contains over 5,000 literary quotations, maxims, proverbs, familiar phrases and unusual expressions, all arranged in alphabetical order by subject matter. For example, if you are called upon to discourse upon the subject of "Accidents," you turn to page 1, run your finger about halfway down the page, and come to this little gem to brighten an otherwise morbid subject: "What may be the perfect accident has been achieved in Santiago, Chile, where a concert soprano fell from a hotel window onto a dentist.—*Atlanta Constitution*." This is the sort of thing the publisher firmly declares "will delight the public speaker's audience."

The battle of words as to who was to blame for our lack of preparedness at Pearl Harbor continues apace. This month's effort was written by one of the principals in the controversy, and is entitled *Admiral Kimmel's Story* ($3.75). Kimmel, it will be remembered, was the Navy commander in Hawaii on the fateful day. There is no gainsaying the good Admiral's right to present his side of the story, and I might add that he does it more effectively than the hysterical outburst of his friend and counselor, Admiral Theobald, some months back. Nevertheless, this is purely a defensive book which does not provide a well-rounded view. It is unfortunate that a lack of public interest will probably preclude the publication of a thorough study of this debacle written by a competent, disinterested historian. Meanwhile, the reputations of Admiral Kimmel and General Short will have to bear the same burden that has vexed those of other military commanders in the past—the commander gets credit when things go right and must take the blame when things go wrong.

Contrary to the view which some of our readers may hold, most of us in the book-reviewing business make an effort to learn more about the subjects of the books we review than that which the author gives us. Consequently, we were particularly pleased the other afternoon to have an office visit from General Walter Krueger, USA, retired, former commander of Sixth Army in the Pacific. General Krueger's visit coincided with an appraisal we were making of the latest volume in the series *The U.S. Army in World War II (Leyte: The Return to the Philippines)* ($6.75) by Dr. M. Hamlin Cannon. This book is being reviewed in some detail in THE ARMY JOURNAL, and it certainly was considered with heightened interest as a result of the absorbing discussion with General Krueger. It was amazing indeed, to find this army commander with such a thorough recall of the full details of that campaign some ten years later, particularly in view of the numerous other campaigns which he so successfully led. I feel he could still give a good account of himself in a similar role if called upon to do so today.—R.F.C.

Report of Nominating Committee

To the Active Members of the Association of the U. S. Army:

1 As provided by the By-Laws of the Association of the U. S. Army, the Executive Council elected the undersigned members as a committee to nominate candidates for election to vacancies occurring in June 1955 among the officers and members of the Executive Council.

2 The Committee met on 21 January 1955 and found that the terms of office of the President and one Vice President would expire in June 1955 and that ten members were to be elected to the Executive Council for three-year terms. The members we nominated for these vacancies appear on the ballot on the facing page. For the information of the membership we have added the present assignment of each nominee.

3 This Committee desires to inform the membership that since the incumbent President is from the Infantry arm we considered it desirable that the next elected President should be an artilleryman. For that reason the two officers nominated for President are from the Artillery arm. To balance this, both nominees for Vice President are infantrymen.

4 The Committee calls the attention of the membership to the By-Laws pertaining to the nomination and election of officers and members of the Executive Council of the Association:

"ART. I. SEC. 1. *Active Membership.* Active membership in the Association shall be open to all members of all components of the United States Army, and to all members of senior Army ROTC Units."

"ART. I. SEC. IV. *Voting Rights.* Only Active Members shall have the right to vote."

"ART. IV. SEC. 1. *Nominating Committee.* In December of each year, the Executive Council shall elect a Nominating Committee of five from among the active membership of the Association, which shall fairly represent, as nearly as practicable, the Active Members as to grades and components."

"ART. IV. SEC. 2. *Election Procedure.* The Nominating Committee shall submit a slate of at least two nominees for each position falling vacant in the coming year, which slate shall be submitted to the active membership by printed ballot, not later than 1 March of the following year. The printed ballot shall contain appropriate spaces for write-in candidates. Such ballot may be distributed to the active membership by return postcard or by ballot printed in the Association's magazine or otherwise, as the Executive Council may determine. Ballots will be counted under the direction of the Executive Council not later than 1 May, and the winning candidates shall take office at the June meeting of the Executive Council. A plurality of the votes cast shall be sufficient for election."

"ART. IV. SEC. 3. *Eligibility of Candidates.* Only Active Members shall be eligible for election to office under this Article."


5 In the upper left hand corner of the envelope in which you mail your ballot please write the words "Association Ballot," followed by your signature, your name typed or printed, and your rank and organization. The illustration below shows how this should be done. Your name will be checked against the roster of members of the Association and if you are an eligible voter your ballot will be counted. Envelopes carrying names of ineligible voters will *not* be opened. Address the envelope (as illustrated below) to: "The Secretary, Association of the U. S. Army, 1529 18th St., N.W., Washington 6, D. C."

6 All ballots must be mailed so as to reach the office of the Association by 20 April 1955.

JAMES C. FRY
Major General, USA
Chairman, Nominating Committee

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
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